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Ken Rutherford
Looking back on another year of successful events and productive programs in humanitarian mine action (HMA) and explo-
sive hazards clearance, we recognize the broad range of ongoing work in the field. In looking toward the future, we are excited 
to announce our new round of topics, published in The Journal’s 2019 Calls for Papers.  
Next Spring, we will explore the community’s thoughts on the direction of future HMA work in an editorial on Planning 
for the Future: Advancing Solutions for Unforeseen Threats. We also encourage organizations to submit on their experienc-
es with anti-lift and anti-handling devices, and explosive ordnance disposal spot tasks, especially as they pertain to Ukraine 
and Eastern European countries. Next Summer, we will examine the ongoing remediation’s efforts in Mosul, Iraq, Yemen, and 
Afghanistan, as well as the issues involved in Distinguishing Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments. And next Fall, we en-
courage those working in HMA to exchange ideas on How Should We Assess New Technology as we look at the monitoring and 
evaluation methods of various HMA organizations as well as different demining training aids. As ever, we also welcome and en-
courage our readers to submit their ideas for topics they feel are underrepresented or particularly timely.
For this issue (22.3) of The Journal, we are thrilled to present an editorial on “Landmine Free 2025: A Shared Responsibility” 
by Camille Wallen from The HALO Trust (HALO) and Chris Loughran from MAG (Mines Advisory Group). Wallen and 
Loughren share their insight on the Landmine Free 2025 Campaign’s call to action, its background, agenda, reception, and 
future plans. As we look to South/Central Asia, Jennifer Dathan from Action on Armed Violence considers “The Effects of 
ERW Contamination in Sri Lanka,” specifically the socioeconomic impact of ERW on civilians and ex-combatants as well as 
the ongoing clearance challenges. CISR’s Suzanne Fiederlein and Paige Ober, and OSCE’s Nazira Shozodaeva and Takhmira 
Akhmedovu discuss their ideas on how their experience with previous trainings, workshops, and Senior Managers’ Courses 
promote innovative ideas for future areas of development in “Opportunities for Regional Training and Information Exchange 
Reap Benefits for Central Asia.” 
Due to the ever-growing industry and versatility of drones, we are particularly happy to have received so many submissions 
on unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in mine action, as this issue features related articles from the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), HALO, MAG, and Binghamton University (New York, USA). Presenting their UAS case 
study on “Enhancing HMA in Angola with High-resolution UAS Imagery,” Inna Cruz (GICHD), Luan Jaupi (HALO), Shadreck 
Njamba (MAG), and Olivier Cottray (GICHD) methodically break down the benefits and challenges of the technology. In “The 
Added Value of Integrating UAVs into the HMA Toolkit,” Shathel Fahs (MAG) and Greg Crowther (MAG) provide an over-
view of UAS current and potential uses. Moreover, Oliver Gerard-Pearse (HALO) presents an in-depth UAS case study on how 
“Drones Support Mine Clearance in Sri Lanka.” Lastly, in this issue’s Research and Development article, Professors Tim de Smet 
and Alex Nikulin and undergraduate researchers William Frazer, Jasper Baur, Jacob Abramowitz, Daniel Finan, Sean Denara, 
Nicholas Aglietti, and Gabriel Campos collaborate on a Binghamton University study on detecting PFM-1 “butterfly mines” 
in “Drones and ‘Butterflies’: A Low-Cost UAV System for Rapid Detection and Identification of Unconventional Minefields.” 
I hope you enjoy this issue of The Journal and consider becoming involved by sharing your work with the rest of the commu-
nity. Moreover, please feel free to provide feedback on The Journal and suggest future topics that you would like to see covered. 
Please email all inquiries and suggestions to: cisr-journal@jmu.edu. 
           Ken
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EDITORIAL
Landmine Free 2025:  
A Shared Responsibility
by Camille Wallen [ The HALO Trust ] and Chris Loughran [ MAG, Mines Advisory Group ]   
On Behalf of the Landmine Free 2025 Campaign 
Just over 20 years ago, states and civil society came together to put an end to the harm inflicted by anti-personnel mines. The result was the ground-breaking 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 1997. Better known 
as the Ottawa Treaty, it prohibited the use, stockpiling, pro-
duction, and transfer of anti-personnel mines. It also created 
time-bound legal obligations requiring the destruction of all 
stockpiles, the clearance of all mined areas, and assistance for 
landmine victims. 
The Ottawa Treaty was truly a beacon of shared effort and 
responsibility to address unacceptable human suffering. It 
was only possible due to determination and a willingness to 
challenge the status quo. It depended on states, individuals, 
and organizations setting aside self-interest in order to act to-
gether for the benefit of communities living with the horror 
of landmines.
A Call to Action
The Third Review Conference took place in Mozambique in 
2014, just as the once mine-ravaged country was on the brink 
of completing its clearance. Gathering in the city that hosted 
the very First Meeting of States Parties fifteen years earlier, 
States Parties aimed to rekindle the same determination and 
finish the job. They committed to the Maputo +15 Declaration, 
including committing “to clear all mined areas as soon as pos-
sible, to the fullest extent possible by 2025.” This target was 
bold and ambitious but achievable. States Parties reaffirmed 
their original commitment to ensure that no mine-affected 
community was forgotten.
Unfortunately, the spark from the community’s original fire 
and determination did not catch light. The years that followed 
saw a steady improvement in operational approaches and ef-
ficiencies, but not the necessary increase in political engage-
ment by States Parties. Clearance of long-forgotten minefields 
from the wars of the 1980’s and 1990’s vanished from donor 
agendas and the public conscience. Angola, once a beacon of 
the Ottawa Treaty, saw support for clearance programs reach 
a 90 percent drop over a decade, dependent on the United 
States for mere survival. 
Globally, progress is not fast enough, with the clock ticking 
and the 2025 target in jeopardy. Meanwhile, over 60 million 
people remain at risk from mines and unexploded ordnance 
with lives, limbs, and hope in jeopardy, and promises and po-
tential unfulfilled.
With the Fourth Review Conference less than a year 
away, there is just enough time to turn the 2025 commit-
ment into a reality. Success will depend on more than a brief 
spark of determination by a handful of committed civil ser-
vants, diplomats, and NGOs. It will also require a concerted 
effort by all stakeholders and a sustained increase in fund-
ing commitment. 
Looking toward 2025, it should be clear that the Ottawa 
Treaty will not implement itself. Implementation depends on 
ownership and leadership by its States Parties for which there 
can be no substitute, including from the United Nations. As 
civil society, we need to step up and work closely together, 
remobilizing the lapsed public support that was essential to 
bringing about the Ottawa Treaty in the first place. We will all 
need to look beyond our community for real innovation. Once 
again, we must challenge and change the status quo.
What is the Landmine Free 2025 Campaign?
Landmine Free 2025 is a campaign to complete landmine 
clearance by 2025. The campaign is a call to action to do-
nor and mine-affected states, civil society, and the public to 
reenergize support for mine clearance. It aims to build and 
strengthen national and global partnership to realize the 
goal of a world free of landmines. The Landmine Free 2025 
New use of landmines, particularly in the Middle East, has created new humanitarian 
priorities and funding requirements for the mine action community. While extensive, 
new contamination from landmines of an improvised nature affects only a handful 
of countries, it must not become an excuse to turn a blind eye to so-called legacy 
contamination, where support falls far short of what is required to achieve the 2025 goal.2
“
“
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campaign also calls for clearance completion strategies to be 
survivor sensitive. Striving for completion must take into ac-
count the reality that the needs of survivors endure for life.
What More is Required?
The Landmine Free 2025 campaign’s first issue brief 
was launched in December 2017 at the Ottawa Treaty’s 
16th Meeting of States and in the 20th anniversary year of 
its signature. The “State of Play - The Landmine Free 2025 
Commitment” report illustrated how a healthy year for mine 
action funding in 2016 masked serious neglect of so-called 
legacy contamination.1 While 2016 saw the third-highest re-
corded international support for demining in a decade at al-
most US$480 million, 30 percent of that funding was spent 
in Iraq and Afghanistan alone, while funding to many other 
countries declined. 
New use of landmines, particularly in the Middle East, has 
created new humanitarian priorities and funding require-
ments for the mine action community. While extensive, new 
contamination from landmines of an improvised nature af-
fects only a handful of countries. It must not become an ex-
cuse to turn a blind eye to so-called legacy contamination, 
where support falls far short of what is required to achieve 
the 2025 goal.2
Of course, there can be little dispute of the need for urgent 
resources for the humanitarian response in the Middle East. 
The region has seen a new landmine emergency and spike 
in casualties, this time from mines of an improvised nature. 
Similarly, increased support to Afghanistan is essential. As 
one of the world’s most contaminated countries, and itself an 
icon of the Ottawa Treaty, Afghanistan has seen a steady re-
duction in funding over the last decade. 
But response to the world’s new conflicts cannot come at 
the expense of communities in countries that are no longer 
the focus of international attention. According to the Mine 
Action Review, around nine out of ten States Parties are off 
track to meet their Article 5 (survey and clearance) dead-
lines.3 A lack of national funding resources in affected states 
and neglect in international cooperation and assistance are 
a key part of this. Unless there is a fundamental shift in the 
scale of funding and the way it is prioritized, the 2025 ob-
jective will be unattainable for many of the 61 mine-affected 
countries and territories. 
State of Play estimated that Angola, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, 
and Zimbabwe needed just short of two and a half times 
2016-funding levels in order to complete clearance obligations 
and commitments by 2025 (2020 for Sri Lanka). That would 
mean additional sustained funding at $54 million a year for 
these four countries until 2025. While this seems high, $54 
million is only 0.2 percent of all global humanitarian funding 
provided in 2017.4 A finite problem of this scale is therefore 
one that policy makers have the capacity to solve.
The sums needed to achieve a Landmine Free 2025 must 
be seen as within reach of the aid budgets, including of many 
Ottawa Treaty States Parties. But to date, the United Kingdom 
is the only State Party to have significantly increased its fund-
ing commitment to the world’s forgotten minefields of Angola, 
Cambodia, and Zimbabwe. 
An Agenda for Change
The 2025 goal can be achieved if all stakeholders recog-
nize the need to work together toward a shared responsibility. 
In a spirit of progressive and forward-thinking partnership, 
we can work to increase funding levels to what is required, 
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Figure 1: Clearance funding trends for Angola, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. 
Figure courtesy of the ‘State of Play’ report, Landmine Free 2025.
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improve efficiency to make best use of resources, and encour-
age innovation. We must also be willing and able to hold each 
other to account, calling out when we see or feel good prac-
tice is not being applied, or when funding is being squandered 
without results or real accountability.
Yet there are important glimmers of hope. The Mine Action 
Review project generated a genuine culture of constructive 
challenge around good practice in survey and clearance. The 
individualized approach spearheaded by Switzerland and the 
Netherlands has done the same for the Article 5 process.5 Closer 
dialogue between NGOs is building long-overdue bridges be-
tween the clearance and victim assistance communities, and 
barriers to confidence and national ownership are being outed. 
These examples of shared responsibility and mutual ac-
countability can be carried across the sector. They should 
be developed to increase political will, enhance cooperation, 
and learn lessons from the past while being innovative and 
setting pragmatic milestones to celebrate achievements to-
ward completion. 
Galvanizing Political Will and Public Support
Achieving and sustaining the necessary funding increase 
for countries to complete clearance will not be possible with-
out an increase in political will among donor countries, par-
ticularly Ottawa Treaty States Parties. Meanwhile effective 
cooperation, strategic planning, and management of the issue 
also requires political engagement in affected states. 
Landmine clearance carries high levels of public support. 
Polling conducted in the United Kingdom in 2017 showed that 
78 percent of the public support it. By harnessing this sup-
port, the mine action community could once again mobilize 
the public conscience to increase awareness, political engage-
ment, and support for funding. In an age of aid skepticism, 
the importance of the public and taxpayers’ support cannot 
be overlooked. 
But public support alone will not 
ensure political and donor support 
in the long-term. To sustain public 
and political interest, the mine action 
community needs to improve the way 
we measure and articulate the impact 
of landmines. We need to ensure it is 
relevant to the broader response to 
current humanitarian crises, develop-
ment potential, and most importantly, 
to people and communities. 
Too often mine action is put in a 
silo, whether in donor funding strat-
egies, national management and oversight, or within the 
United Nations system. This frequently results in a lack of 
awareness or buy-in among senior government officials and 
national authorities being confined to departments with 
limited inf luence. 
Meanwhile, the impact of landmines does not exist in isola-
tion. They not only remain a threat to lives and limbs, but also 
block access to homes, land resources and services, and hin-
der recovery and socioeconomic development decades after 
the end of conflict. Their impact is also greatest on the most 
vulnerable—women, girls, boys, and men—who have lost 
their homes and livelihoods to conflict. 
Mine action stakeholders must work together to demon-
strate the continued impact of landmines on the world’s most 
vulnerable communities. Demonstrating how clearance can 
support humanitarian protection, livelihoods, health, and 
trade is vital to break out of silos and rejuvenate support, par-
ticularly in countries that have fallen off the radar of most do-
nors’ foreign policy interests. In doing so we should reverse 
the trend of talking about mine-affected communities in 
Geneva or New York where they are almost always unable to 
participate. Instead, we should use modern technology to give 
them the seat at the table that is rightly theirs.
Broadening Cooperation
Coordination and cooperation between stakeholders can 
help to create clear national strategies, which are essential for 
every affected state. The chance of success is greatest when 
the development of plans is led and owned by national au-
thorities with in-country support from donor states and op-
erating organizations.
A good national strategy is an essential step for every af-
fected state to work toward completion. It should clearly assess 
the extent of mine contamination remaining, planning the 
best use of clearance resources and organizations in country, 
FUNDING REQUIRED
Multiples of Current Funding
7.3x
1.3x
1.5x
3.0x
2.4x
ANGOLA
CAMBODIA
SRI LANKA
ZIMBABWE
TOTAL
Figure 2. Estimated funding uplift required to reach clearance deadlines. 
Figure courtesy of the ‘State of Play’ report, Landmine Free 2025.
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and calculate the funding requirement to complete by 2025 or 
sooner if possible. 
Where there are successes in coordination such as the indi-
vidualized approach, we should build on them and the prog-
ress they have achieved for countries like Lebanon, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Similar enhancement in cooperation is 
achieved when stakeholders work together to support states in 
their development of Article 5 extension requests. These can 
go on to act as the basis of common plans and avoid dupli-
cation. Partnership agreements between donors and affected 
states are a further approach that proved critical in supporting 
Mozambique to achieve completion in 2015.
The Ottawa Treaty’s Fourth Review Conference in 2019 is 
an opportunity to agree on a collective road map for realiz-
ing the 2025 aspiration. If the mine action community does 
not seize it, they will run out of time to achieve 2025 com-
pletion goals. If we embrace the opportunity of the Review 
Conference and are, together, willing to make the change 
needed, we can still succeed.
Funding and Innovation
There should be no doubt that a step change in funding for 
many so-called legacy countries is required to achieve the 
2025 aspiration. To help countries achieve clearance by 2025, 
our sector needs to be more collaborative, but also more inno-
vative, with renewed thinking about funding. 
Many States Parties can and should increase their funding 
commitments. But simply asking existing donors to give more 
is unlikely to succeed on its own and funding could benefit 
from fresh thinking, including exploring innovative aid fi-
nancing mechanisms. This could include impact investments, 
bonds, and collaborative approaches to leverage private fi-
nancing. Innovation of this sort will take imagination, cour-
age, and trust. But it could ultimately offer a lifeline to the 
2025 aspiration and make a key contribution to achieving a 
Landmine Free 2025. 
Celebrating Achievements
The 2025 goal may be bold and ambitious, but it is an im-
portant, achievable target for many states. As with any glob-
al target, such as the Sustainable Development Goals, we 
must be pragmatic about the campaign’s implementation 
and break it down into achievable milestones. This could be 
a country’s completion, or completion of provinces in highly- 
contaminated countries such as Afghanistan. Whenever an 
opportunity for celebrating success exists, we should col-
lectively harness it and use it to reinforce our commitment. 
Drawing attention to the issue will not only benefit those 
States that could complete by 2025, but it will generate mo-
mentum that could benefit all mine-affected countries.
Looking Forward 
We were recently asked,  “So, what will the Landmine Free 
2025 campaign say in 2026 when there are still landmines left 
in the world?” This was an important and helpful question, 
and the type of constructive challenge the mine action com-
munity needs. The world is imperfect and there may well still 
be landmines to clear. This will likely be in some of the most 
heavily contaminated countries, places with restricted ac-
cess due to ongoing conflict, or as a result of new contamina-
tion. But it must not include landmines that could have been 
cleared yet were not as a result of broken promises. Moreover, 
there can be no dispute over whether or not the remaining 
landmines need to be cleared. 
The issue is not about whether some landmines remain 
when we wake up on the first of January 2026. It is about the 
choices we made before then and the steps we took to avoid 
failing 60 million people and future generations. It is about 
whether we were willing to set aside our self-interest, work 
closer together, strive even harder, embrace innovation, and 
change the status quo when it does not reflect what we funda-
mentally believe. We must not only do what is possible, but 
what is necessary, and what is right.   
See endnotes page 59
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THE ADDED VALUE OF 
INTEGRATING UAVS INTO 
THE HMA TOOLKIT
by Shathel Fahs and Greg Crowther [ MAG (Mines Advisory Group) ]
FEATURE: UAVS IN MINE ACTION
The rapid and ongoing development of lightweight, powerful, and relatively cheap unmanned aircraft vehicles (UAV)—still commonly referred to as drones—has demonstrated their use in increasingly di-
verse and imaginative ways across a large number of industries and sec-
tors. They have also captured the public imagination with the prospect of 
revolutionizing many aspects of how we live and work. Humanitarian mine 
action (HMA) has not been immune to this process, and a number of orga-
nizations have conducted research, trials, and field tests into how they can 
support and improve the landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
survey and clearance process.
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) has trialed and employed UAVs across a 
number of programs and has now started to integrate them fully into the 
operational toolkit in a number of contexts. This article outlines MAG’s ex-
perience with UAV operations, indicating where they appear to currently 
add the most value and where the technology may be headed. MAG’s expe-
rience is that while UAVs can make a substantial and beneficial contribution 
to the mine action sector, like any technology, they are better suited to 
some tasks than others. They add the most value when integrated into the 
survey and clearance process, particularly when linked to effective infor-
mation management (IM) systems and used with clear standard operating 
procedures that complement other activities. Their use is also dependent 
on national level regulations surrounding the use of UAVs, which often lie 
outside of the HMA coordination body itself. 
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Overview of the Technology
MAG has generally favored the use of small, relatively cheap 
UAVs, such as the DJI Magic Pro or the DJI Phantom, in con-
trast to some of the UAV research projects we have been in-
vited to review and comment on. With support from the U.S. 
Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Research 
and Development Program (HD R&D), MAG conducted 
field evaluations of these UAVs for more than four years in 
Cambodia. In addition, MAG has also used the DJI Mavic Pro 
in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. These UAVs have the advantage 
of being widely available, relatively robust, easy to use, and 
simple to maintain. Demining operations typically take place 
in challenging environments, and these qualities are essential 
for the effective integration of new tools. Many of these cri-
teria of course apply to any form of technology when being 
integrated into demining operations in challenging contexts. 
These particular UAVs also have the capabilities and technical 
specifications that MAG requires to undertake the tasks that 
UAVs are currently most suited: survey. 
Pre- and Post-clearance Survey 
A UAV is only a vehicle for undertaking an existing mine 
action process. In terms of UAVs, these can be broken down 
into two main areas: survey and detection. Based on trials to 
date, UAVs’ primary added value to the HMA process is im-
proving the speed, precision, and quality of pre- and post-
clearance survey in suspected (SHA) or confirmed hazardous 
areas (CHA), allowing for better planning, operational man-
agement, and monitoring. The UAV allows access to otherwise 
inaccessible areas and high-resolution images to be gathered, 
whether inside or around a collapsed building in Syria or over 
a heavily vegetated forest in Cambodia.
Understanding the hazardous area is a key element in task 
planning. Improving knowledge about terrain, vegetation, 
and obstacles can greatly improve a task manager’s abili-
ty to plan how to approach the technical survey and clear-
ance process. Without UAVs, information about a task site 
is based on community interviews, historical knowledge, 
and an assessment from known safe areas. Often times, only 
Figure 1. The same sites shown with UAV maps displaying updated high resolution images of the site where locals are using the 
land for farming and housing. 
All figures courtesy of MAG.
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limited amounts of the suspect land can be physically ac-
cessed or even seen. Initially, the use of UAV images can 
improve interviews with key informants and beneficiaries, 
as showing them the pictures captured by the UAV allows 
them to offer a more detailed explanation regarding both 
the threat and the impact of the contamination. In some 
contexts, such as Iraq, MAG is anticipating that UAV-based 
survey will provide initial information about the location 
and extent of minefields laid with surface-lying or shallow-
buried improvised devices. 
Beyond simply improving human level information gather-
ing as part of non-technical survey, UAVs allow for greater de-
tail about task sites through spatial imaging (see Figure 1), all 
of which can be made even more powerful through the adop-
tion of an integrated information management approach. 
Spatial imaging works by placing an imaging sensor on 
the underside of the UAV and, in most cases, establishing 
a pre-entered f light path that allows the UAV to autono-
mously map the required area without direct operator con-
trol. This imaging can then be transferred and processed 
by an on-site computer, which provides detailed infor-
mation on terrain and vegetation density as well as high- 
resolution imagery. This allows vegetation density to be cat-
egorized into light or heavy, which then allows task man-
agers to decide if manual string trimmers or mechanical 
assets would be preferable for ground preparation prior to 
clearance (see Figure 2). Terrain analysis can identify oth-
erwise hidden obstacles, like ditches or mounds, and allow 
for better planning in terms of access lanes and angles of ap-
proach for machines in areas that would be difficult to iden-
tify for someone operating remotely. 
UAVs are made even more powerful when effectively inte-
grated with IM systems such as ArcGIS. MAG has built an in-
tegrated suite of tools around the ESRI ArcGIS system. This 
allows UAV captured imagery to be integrated into the broad-
er GIS and IM systems used by MAG, through a combina-
tion of Drone2Map for data processing and ArcGIS for spatial 
analyses, where all UAV-captured maps can be made avail-
able online. The Collector for ArcGIS mobile app can also 
be used to view the UAV imagery offline when used in the 
field. When integrated into the full Esri ArcGIS application 
suite, information such as polygons, evidence from historical 
tasks, casualty data, etc., can be overlaid over both the high- 
resolution drone and low-resolution satellite imagery, again 
improving planning, presentations, and operational briefings 
(see Figure 4).
Potential Usage: Enhanced Detection
Several research projects have appeared to focus on detec-
tion, aiming to develop sensors that can be fitted and carried 
Figure 2. A 3D module of a battle area clearance site in Northeast Cambodia produced from drone images using Drone2Map and 
ArcGIS Pro. The Polygon, clearance boxes, and cluster munition symbols were overlaid on the 3D layer of the site along with spa-
tial analyses of DTM and DSM.
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Figure 3. Sample drone images of a battle area clearance site in Northeast Cambodia where the UAV maps replaced the satellite 
base map and vegetation analyses, divided into three categories.
by UAVs. While feasible and a potentially useful development, 
this only really adds value if the specific detection capability 
itself is equal to or an improvement on existing manual, me-
chanical or animal-based detection systems from the perspec-
tive of safety, quality or efficiency.  
It may be that in some environments, particularly those 
with limited vegetation and flat terrain, that a form of UAV-
mounted detector may be able to undertake technical sur-
vey and clearance as quickly and safely as existing methods, 
and add some specific value to the process in terms of ei-
ther speed, access, or cost-effectiveness. MAG will shortly be 
trialing one such UAV-mounted detection system, again in 
Cambodia, that combines ground-penetrating radar (GPR), 
light detection and ranging (LiDR), millimeter wave, com-
puter vision, and artificial intelligence technologies that may 
enable reliable detection of anti-vehicle and anti-personnel 
mines as well as subsurface ERW. 
Capturing and Quantifying Impact
As a humanitarian non-profit organization, MAG is al-
ways looking for ways to measure and demonstrate impact. 
Conducting pre- and post-clearance flyovers with UAVs al-
lows for changes in land use to be captured in high levels of 
detail. For unused land that is turned into a mix of residen-
tial and agricultural plots, MAG can accurately determine 
how each type of land is used. For more detailed studies, dif-
ferent crop types can be identified through pattern recogni-
tion analysis, allowing specific and quantifiable benefits to be 
measured based on the type of crop and amount of released 
land being used to farm it. As with the pre-clearance non-
technical survey process, images can be shown to beneficia-
ries to better identify how they have used particular parts of 
the land. The change in the way land is used—before clear-
ance, during clearance, and after clearance—allows MAG to 
demonstrate the dynamic impact of clearance to the donor 
community and other stakeholders. 
Conclusion
UAVs are proving to be integral to the survey and clearance 
process by improving planning, management, and monitor-
ing capabilities as well as increasing operational safety. They 
undoubtedly add signif icant value while reducing costs 
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by demonstrating value-for-money through better post- 
clearance assessment and are likely to become a stan-
dard part of most operational toolkits. Wherever allowed, 
MAG will continue to test, trial, and use UAVs for a range of 
Figure 4. Satellite photos displaying outdated images of the sites, in which only forest can be seen.
purposes. Where permissions for the use of UAVs are difficult 
to obtain, we would strongly encourage national mine action 
authorities to lobby for their use as part of the drive toward 
improved management of mine action processes. 
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ENHANCING HUMANITARIAN MINE 
ACTION IN ANGOLA WITH HIGH-
RESOLUTION UAS IMAGERY
by Inna Cruz [ GICHD ], Luan Jaupi [ The HALO Trust ], Shadrack Kassanga Njamba Sequesseque [ MAG ], 
and Olivier Cottray [ GICHD ]
The peaceful use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in-creases significantly when their cost and complexity are reduced. Fully autonomous, ultralight unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV) are now commercially available.1 There 
are numerous UAS applications in humanitarian mine action 
(HMA), environmental research and survey, and urban infra-
structure management and maintenance. 
According to the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action 
(Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD), mapping is the most 
evolved form of drone use in HMA today.2 The technology is 
well established, and skilled users can quickly produce infor-
mation products that are of immediate use for humanitarian 
programs. Other possible applications, such as delivery of car-
go, use in monitoring and delivery of real-time information, 
and assistance in search and rescue are still very promising 
and under operational investigation. 
The potential benefits of using UAS technologies in HMA 
are still being fully explored.3 Past use focused mainly on 
detecting individual mines and explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) using large, expensive UAS units. Large research proj-
ects have explored how to assist HMA processes using more 
advanced technology and systems, including UAS.4 The focus 
of these projects was mainly on using sensors and ground pen-
etrating radar (GPR) for mine and ERW detection. Most re-
cently, the U.K. consortium led by the Science and Technology 
Facilities Council’s (STFC) Rutherford Appleton Laboratory 
(RAL) Space, together with Cranfield University and Fardoulis 
Robotics, is investigating how to gain the most impact in com-
ing years by using UAS and satellite technology. According to 
researchers, the utility gained from small UAS spans a range 
of operations, though these systems have not yet been opera-
tionally tested in the framework of the U.K. consortium proj-
ect.4 The Urs Endress Foundation has collaborated with Swiss 
and German universities to develop a UAV-based system for 
mine detection since early 2016. The system consists of a 5 kg 
(11 lb) payload drone, a low-cost, real-time kinematic glob-
al navigation satellite system (RTK-GNSS), cameras for pho-
togrammetric production of digital terrain model (DTM), 
microwave sensors for mine detection, and an anti-collision 
system (https://www.ue-stiftung.org/findmine). 
The main purpose of the project carried out by the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
was to identify immediate benefits that UAS products, such 
as mapping and digital surface models (DSM), can bring to 
mine action operations. The GICHD recognizes that UAS are 
an additional tool for collecting valuable geospatial informa-
tion to assist organizations in planning, monitoring, and sur-
veying tasks. Of key importance is the professional analysis 
of UAS output products carried out in the field by operations 
and program management in order to make informed deci-
sions.5 Based on the feedback from our partners, The HALO 
Trust (HALO) and MAG (Mines Advisory Group), potential 
benefits were identified during the land release process. 
Project Methodology
Initially, the GICHD mapped the benefits and challenges of 
using UAS for mine action operations via several online sur-
veys conducted between 2012 and 2014. The purpose of these 
surveys was to identify user needs and explore the potential 
use of UAS in HMA. This feasibility study found that imag-
es acquired with UAS can be used to immediately enhance 
planning, recording, and reporting capabilities at the differ-
ent stages of the land release process, namely non-technical 
survey, technical survey, and clearance. In order to verify 
this hypothesis and to determine and evaluate the operation-
al challenges, the second phase of the project, real-time field 
testing with GICHD partners, started in 2015 and was final-
ized in 2017. Potential benefits, grouped by different activities, 
FEATURE: UAVS IN MINE ACTION
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Although a more detailed overview of UAS outputs with 
regard to land release activities are described later, imagery 
products were used for the following purposes: 
 » Indicate the impact of uncleared land to donors.
 » Show evidence of blocked resources.
 » Illustrate visible, indirect indicators of contamination. 
 » Document evidence for land cancellation. 
 » Monitor and report on progress and completion. 
 » Map demolition sites and identify patterns. 
Before Operations
UAS imagery with information on confirmed hazardous 
areas (CHA) visually shows the impact of contaminated land 
to donors and the public. It also shows blocked access to water, 
agricultural land, paths, roads, and important infrastructure. 
The aim is to use such maps for fundraising purposes. 
are listed in Figure 1; UAS mine action 
operators scored information manage-
ment (IM) output products by their de-
gree of usefulness during operations. 
Moreover, challenges and alternative 
options were identified and described.
Results of the UAS Case Study 
in Angola 
The fixed-wing, small, and light-
weight UAS eBee (manufactured by 
senseFly) is being used in Angola across 
a range of different demining applica-
tions and was first operated by HALO 
in the framework of the current project 
and later by MAG. 
UAS produce high-resolution imag-
ery and information that bring added 
operational value across a wide range of 
different applications. These uses range 
from updating cartography before 
mine action operations take place and 
non-technical survey tasks such as geo-
locating suspected hazardous areas 
(SHA), to operational planning for 
technical survey, clearance, and post 
clearance land documentation (Figure 
1).6 During the test period, HALO and 
MAG field personnel reported that UAS 
produced imagery and information 
products that assisted organizations in 
planning, internal and external com-
munication, and reporting. 
HALO and MAG highly valued information products de-
veloped during testing for communications with the public 
and donors, and that could show land use changes after de-
mining operations. Based on the questionnaire answers filled 
out by the UAS test manager from HALO “pre-and post-clear-
ance land use is a great way to demonstrate value for money” 
as it shows the positive impact of humanitarian demining on 
agricultural and urban land development of previously con-
taminated areas. 
The two organizations also highly rated high-resolution map 
products that assisted in the planning of demining operations. 
For example, imagery was used for information collection and 
planning purposes in inaccessible hazardous areas. Moreover, 
MAG used maps for monitoring and planning future clearance 
operations that had been suspended during the rainy season. 
Highly rated by both organizations
Highly rated by one organization
Not yet tested
Use of Output Product Benefits
1.1. UAS imagery shows impact of un-
cleared land to donors and the public
Fundraising
Increased public awareness 
1.2. Proof of blocked agricultural land, 
paths, access to water, roads and impor-
tant infrastructure
Fundraising
Local prioritisation analysis
MRE (mine-risk education)
1.3. To update cartography material Planning
Prioritisation
Collection of information about the envi-
ronment in inaccessible areas  
2.1. To indicate visible indirect evidence 
of contamination/explosive remnants of 
war
Proof of indirect evidence for suspected 
hazardous area (SHA) identification
2.2. To document evidence for land 
cancellation
Land cancellation justification, liability
2.3.  To record coordinates of hazardous 
area polygons/points
Coordinates for hazardous areas and de-
mining operations collected and recorded
3.1. To assist in planning of demining 
operations
Selection of appropriate tool, selection of 
best TS paths, analysis of environmental 
conditions of terrain
3.2. To monitor demining operations, and 
report on progress and completion
Monitoring of mine action operation 
progress, estimation of completion date, 
evidence for completion documentation
3.3.  To map demolitions and identify 
patterns
Providing completion documentation 
and identification of possible patterns for 
future NTS activities
4.1. External communication with the 
public and donors
Use of high-resolution imagery during 
land handover to local communities, to il-
lustrate progress of mine action clearance 
to donors
4.2. To show land use changes Changes in land use after demining op-
erations can justify prioritisation choices 
made by the mine action centre and oper-
ators to donors, act as proof of resources 
used, collection of socio-economic data
4.3. Liability justification Reliable justification in case of accidents/
incidents inside released area
Figure 1. Matrix of UAS output products.
All graphics courtesy of authors.
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As shown in the HALO story map, most people living in 
Cutato village survive on agriculture. During the Angolan 
Civil War (1975–2002) the village was repeatedly mined, and 
at least 11 people have suffered landmine accidents here; how-
ever, HALO has cleared the minefields in and around Cutato. 
UAS imagery shows that newly built infrastructure is in close 
proximity to recently cleared areas, so without mine clearance, 
growing communities are at risk from landmines laid over 30 
years ago. At the same time, UAS imagery provides informa-
tion on land that is not accessible due to landmines. In Figure 
2, the remains of the old bridge destroyed during the war are 
visible inside the perimeter of the minefield. Furthermore, de-
velopment activities are not viable on that side because they 
are blocked by mine contamination.
In Bié Province, access to water for agricultural develop-
ment was blocked by a minefield located between the vil-
lage and the river. However, it was recently cleared by HALO 
personnel. The imagery shows the importance of water and 
irrigation for this region, as the area around the river is no-
ticeably greener than the rest (Figure 3).  
Imagery collected with UAS is also 
used to update cartography material. 
Most actors in the field of humanitar-
ian demining today employ publicly 
available satellite data like Google 
Earth or old topographic maps of 
the areas in which they operate. This 
assists mine action organizations 
over large areas. However, compared 
to UAS outputs, satellite data is often 
low-resolution, expensive, and inac-
cessible for certain areas when there is 
dense cloud coverage.6  
Non-technical Survey
The most common use of extremely 
high-resolution, low-cost aerial photos 
produced by UAVs is for data collec-
tion and observation, and serves as an 
Figure 2. Cutato village.
Figure 3. Bié Province where access to water is blocked.
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most densely-covered vegetated areas, UAS-
assisted operations are excellent for data col-
lection in areas with difficult access. 
HALO conducted several UAS flights over 
an active minefield in Cuando Cubando 
province. These flights enabled the specif-
ic pinpointing of a tank that had been aban-
doned in the minefield (Figure 4). Trenches 
are also visible on UAS imagery in Bié 
Province (Figure 5). 
Information collected on the ground was 
used together with UAS imagery as support-
ing evidence that the area had already been 
used for some time for agriculture by the 
returning population, was not mined, and 
could therefore be cancelled (Figure 6). In 
this way, UAS imagery combined with ar-
chived non-technical survey interviews was 
used as justification for land cancellation.
Technical Survey and Clearance 
During technical survey and clearance op-
erations, imagery produced by UAS helps in 
planning future operations by providing in-
formation about available paths, types of 
terrain and vegetation, and information on 
slope gradients. 
HALO’s task was to clear minefields in 
Cuando Cubando province. Each side of 
the road was assigned a similar task. While 
clearance of the right side of the road was 
already completed at the time of the UAS 
survey flight, the information about envi-
ronmental variables (slope, soil type, and 
vegetation) and the pattern of found mines 
was thought to be similar to the hazardous 
area on the left side of the road. The high- 
resolution map produced by the UAS with 
overlaid completion report data was very 
useful for the site supervisor in order to plan the remain-
ing clearance task more efficiently. The UAS imagery would 
be useful for site supervisors planning clearance; however, it 
was not immediately accessible for such operational analy-
sis as most supervisors do not have laptops on which to see 
it. Hence, the analysis was done in their offices several weeks 
later. An additional difficulty was the lack of availability and 
capacity for using specialized geographic information system 
(GIS) software to preview and analyze the data. 
Figure 4 (top). Indirect evidence of contamination, tank.
Figure 5 (middle). Visible trenches. 
Figure 6 (bottom). Land cancellation proven by the use of UAS imagery combined 
with information on the ground.
additional helpful tool during non-technical survey activities. 
Currently, these systems are not considered adequate to de-
tect the presence of ERW contamination, although indirect 
indicators of contamination can be detected, such as the pres-
ence of trench lines, barbed wire, and impact craters. Very of-
ten, the main challenge to carrying out timely and accurate 
surveys is poor physical access due to heavy vegetation, the 
absence of roads, security obstacles, flooding, bodies of wa-
ter, snow and ice, or steep hills and gorges.7 For all but the 
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Figure 7. Craters from controlled demolition of anti-vehicle mines in a minefield in Cuito Cuanavale.
Figure 8. Tepa minefield, October 2016 (left), April 2017 (right).
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UAS data together with minefield clearance sketch maps 
could potentially predict the location of contamination. In 
some cases, the craters from safe demolitions were visible on 
the imagery (Figure 7). As certain minefields are laid out in 
strict patterns, being able to see the pattern of craters may 
help to plan future operations.6 
In October 2016, MAG operators conducted flights over 
the Tepa minefield to monitor progress. However, clearance 
had to be suspended because of the rainy season. From April 
to May 2017, UAS collected imagery over the same minefield, 
assisting with the planning for resuming clearance of the 
minefield, as the technical survey lines were still visible on 
UAS imagery (Figure 8). 
The DTM derived from UAS imagery will also provide 
valuable information for planning the demining machines’ 
paths and to avoid slopes and identify the best access routes. 
HALO and MAG operators both found UAS imagery useful 
for monitoring and reporting on technical survey and clear-
ance progress (Figure 9). 
Post Clearance
Extremely high-resolution map products allow mine action 
teams to record changes in land use more accurately by pro-
viding precise aerial imagery before and after demining op-
erations. Using this imagery, HALO produced web maps and 
case studies to demonstrate the impact of mine clearance on 
vulnerable communities.6 
The Lingonga East minefield was handed over by MAG to 
the local community in June 2016. The UAS imagery in Figure 
11 shows a green line crossing the whole area depicting the 
Figure 9. Monitoring the progress of technical survey and clearance.
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footpath inside the already released area leading to the river 
where the local community fetches water for drinking, baths, 
and laundry (Figure 11). 
Another example is the Muhinhi 2 minefield that was 
cleared by MAG and handed over to the local population in 
2013. It has since turned into a highly-populated village in 
Lucusse commune. The successful clearance of the minefield, 
which yielded over 100 anti-personnel mines and 16 items 
of unexploded ordnance (UXO) has directly benefited 2,292 
members of the local community (Figure 12). 
Operational Exploitation of UAS
Generally, UAS technologies have proven to be user 
friendly. Several days of training provided by the GICHD 
and senseFly were sufficient to start UAS operations, al-
though operators asked for remote assistance throughout 
the testing period. 
HALO and MAG have good relationships with local authori-
ties, so it was not difficult to obtain all the necessary permissions 
for the UAS flights. However, the amount of attention UAS oper-
ations attract meant that it was essential to communicate prop-
erly with the local government and police, providing them with 
flight details and sending flight plans in advance. 
Both organizations encountered some difficulties with 
equipment maintenance (logistics, battery replacement, ad-
ditional repairs). Constraints such as difficult terrain for 
landing, weather conditions, poor electricity supply, and un-
reliable Internet access were also listed by HALO and MAG 
representatives. Public curiosity, particularly from local chil-
dren, presented another challenge and could be an issue dur-
ing UAV landing operations. 
Some hypotheses could not be proved. While UAS can rap-
idly produce georeferences (accurate GPS references) or 3D 
maps that outline the boundaries of hazardous areas more 
accurately than walking along the same path on the ground 
with a standard GPS, there were insufficient personnel to test 
this. Nevertheless, initial surveys can be conducted more 
quickly and without risks to the survey team carrying a hand-
held GPS, who thereafter communicate the imagery to local 
communities to confirm the mapping results.8 
As previously noted, the FSD report on “Drones in 
Humanitarian Action” states that drones are becoming easier 
to use and that the main challenge is shifting from flying the 
drones to processing, analyzing, and storing the data that the 
drones capture.2 The same conclusion was reached as a result 
of the case study in Angola. Insufficient capacity, such as spe-
cialized software and hardware, for imagery and data analysis 
meant that the scope of the imagery produced by UAS could 
not be used. For example, the DSM generated from UAS im-
ages also calculates the gradient of different slopes and could 
potentially be used in determining suitable access routes for 
demining machines.6
Figure 10. Land use changes after demining was completed (the imagery on the left is from 2011, whereas the right is from 2016).
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Selecting Appropriate UAS 
Equipment or Service Providers
The most important element in the selection process is to 
identify imagery requirements for a project. In order to ad-
dress decision-making requirements, the focus should be 
on what kind of imagery an organization needs. Alternative 
UAS-produced imagery should also be considered and prop-
erly analyzed. Before starting to collect data, an organization 
needs to decide whether it will build its own UAS capacities 
or to seek a service provider. The following selection criteria 
should be taken into account: 
 » Price (of equipment, maintenance, capacity building, li-
censes, insurance). 
 » Import/export regulations (time and resources).
 » Qualifications (to operate UAVs and to process, ana-
lyze, and store imagery).
Figure 11. Access to the river after minefield clearance.
 » Length and frequency of UAS surveys.
 » Data ownership.
The main conclusion from the case study in Angola is user- 
friendly UAS technology is already available on the market, 
and several days of training are enough to learn how to oper-
ate UAS and collect data. However, the main challenges are 
the capacities for  professional imagery analysis, the storage 
of huge amounts of collected imagery data, and the use of 
specialized software. 
For example, according to a case study described by FSD, 
the data collected for the Dar es Salaam flood risk map had 
to be processed externally and took six weeks with high-
speed processors. Mapping an area of 88 sq km (34 sq mi) 
with an average resolution of 5 cm created a data set con-
taining 20,000 optical images. After processing, the result-
ing files totaled 700 Gb, and the data could only be moved by 
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Figure 12. Muhinhi 2 minefield cleared by MAG.
physically transferring the hard disk. Clearly, requirements 
such as these make it challenging for the technology to be op-
erational in a crisis situation.2 In some cases, specific tasks 
can be outsourced. For example, imagery data collection can 
be performed by an organization, while the imagery process-
ing and analysis part can be outsourced to a qualified NGO or 
commercial company. 
There are legal prerequisites to consider when conducting 
UAS operations, which will depend on the legislation of the 
respective country. Generally, UAS operations should be ap-
proved by local authorities, airspace controllers, and the local 
police. Mine action organizations usually operate in post-con-
flict areas where drones might be used for military purposes. 
Therefore it may be useful to inform the local community about 
a UAS flight path and purpose in order to avoid any problems 
during the flight. Equipment maintenance and insurance re-
quirements should also be considered, as both testing organi-
zations in Angola emphasized the difficulty in maintaining the 
eBee equipment in a rural environment. Since the eBee soft-
ware required regular updates, poor Internet availability in the 
areas of operation presented a challenge.  
Conclusion
Together with HALO and MAG, GICHD conducted a case 
study in Angola, illustrating how UAS imagery—when infra-
structure and permissions allow this data to be collected—helps 
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in the planning and monitoring of HMA operations. These out-
puts can also be used to record proof of cancellation for SHA, 
and the DSM generated from UAS imagery can be used to help 
teams prepare routes for demining machines. The fact that UAS 
can be used to accurately document land use changes, such as 
urbanization and agricultural development, is also of great help 
in communicating demining efforts to donors. 
To summarize, using UAS in HMA improves operational 
efficiencies by providing an on-demand eye from the sky. As 
UAS become more affordable and easier to operate in diffi-
cult terrain, and as imagery processing and analysis becomes 
more intuitive and less dependent on the internet, the com-
munity might see their deployment on a large scale in the 
years to come. 
However, successful deployment of UAS requires clearly-
defined project needs, an assessment of available capacities, 
and careful consideration of safety and situational suitability. 
These recommendations can assist HMA actors in the effec-
tive use of UAS, which indeed lend themselves as the best tool 
for this kind of work.2
Looking Ahead
UAS show promise in applications involving close, in-house 
inspections for improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq 
(JANUS, MAG), direct/indirect evidence detection based on 
the analysis of UAS imagery, GPR technology used in the case 
of larger UAS and for mine/UXO detection and much more. 
The GICHD has developed a UAS Portal where the results of 
various case studies carried out around the world are present-
ed. It is a knowledge exchange platform to disseminate UAS 
case study results, and we encourage organizations to share 
their UAS case studies on it. 
We also provide consultancy services to assist interested or-
ganizations in:
 » Advice for building one’s own UAS capacity.
 » Imagery analysis training (available soon).
 » Selecting appropriate imagery sources.
 » Selecting UAS imagery service providers.
 » UAS imagery analysis.
UAS imagery products are easy to integrate into the IMSMA 
Core environment and are a valuable source of information on 
contaminated terrain, priority settings, geolocation of con-
taminated areas, and post-clearance analysis. An appropriate 
IMAS technical note will be developed between 2019 and 2020 
to guide the use of this technology in HMA. 
See endnotes page 59
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FEATURE
DRONES SUPPORTING MINE CLEARANCE 
IN NORTHERN SRI LANKA 
by Oliver Gerard-Pearse [ The HALO Trust ]
The humanitarian mine action (HMA) community’s nascent adoption of commercial drone 
technology has no doubt made a posi-
tive impact within the sector. However, 
drones go underutilized in HMA and 
many opportunities as well as potential 
pitfalls remain.
Nurturing and developing this tech-
nology to assist in an increasingly di-
verse and evolving industry will benefit 
the community greatly. However, drones 
have only recently drawn the public eye 
with considerable strides forward in de-
veloping technology that is now available 
and financially accessible to the general 
public. Popular commercial brands are 
appealing more to the budding photog-
raphers and video bloggers that are able 
to achieve a professional angle in photo-
graphs or videos. 
This article reviews the opportunities 
and associated challenges that drones 
present to the HMA sector before pre-
senting a case study of drones used to 
support mine clearance in Sri Lanka to 
clear the densely-laid Muhamalai mine-
field. It concludes with recommenda-
tions for the implementation of drones 
in other HMA programs.
Drones in Conventional Mine Clearance: 
Challenges and Opportunities 
With the rapid increase in drone popularity and general 
use, many governments have struggled to produce formal 
legislation regarding the parameters in which the machines 
may be used, some presenting restrictions, limiting any prac-
tical use at all. In contrast, others have yet to acknowledge the 
requirement for such regulations. In post-conflict countries, 
even the word drone may prompt skepticism, however, gener-
ally the use of small commercial drones is allowed. 
Currently, there are no formally developed national or in-
ternational standards for the use of drones in mine clear-
ance operations. However, a number of concepts have been 
developed to assist directly in detection and mapping tasks 
within some mine contaminated environments. This tech-
nology, although not used widely in the sector, has the clear 
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Figure 1. Map of Sri Lanka.
Map courtesy of CISR.
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potential to develop and aid in the clearance of landmines and 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the near future. With 
the support of the U.S. Department of Defense Humanitarian 
Demining R&D Program, The HALO Trust (HALO) has been 
using standard commercial drones in their programs around 
the world for a number of different tasks. These include high- 
resolution videos for communications and fundraising, train-
ing videos, and imagery for donor reporting purposes.
While drones certainly have advantageous uses in HMA, 
they are not without their drawbacks. First, due to political 
instability and ongoing conflict in some countries, the use of 
drones is not possible. Second, with standard drones, battery 
life and the subsequent flight range is quite limiting. Flying in 
areas or conducting tasks that require a drone to be airborne 
for longer than 20 minutes is just not possible. However, this 
can be avoided in most cases through careful planning. 
Figure 2. A hand-drawn sketch map of the cleared areas within HALO’s area of operations. Yellow marks manual clearance and 
green marks mechanical clearance. The scale is 1 cm = 20 m.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
26
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss3/1
27ISSUE 22.3 @ NOVEMBER 2018
Case Study: Drones Supporting Mine Clearance 
in Sri Lanka
HALO’s program in northern Sri Lanka increasingly relies 
on drones to manage the clearance of the biggest and most 
complex minefield the organization is currently working 
on: the Muhamalai Forward Defensive Line. Muhamalai in 
Killinochchi District, Northern Province saw eight years of 
fighting over a 10.5 sq km (4.1 sq mi) strip of land connect-
ing Jaffna, Sri Lanka’s most northern district, to the rest of the 
country. Dense mine lines were laid by the Sri Lanka Army 
(SLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that 
today, nine years on, are stopping hundreds of displaced peo-
ple from returning home.
Clearance of this area first began in 2011, spearheaded by 
HALO, with initial operations aimed at clearing the main A9 
highway connecting Jaffna to Colombo. Quickly after public 
access was created, the railway line that had been destroyed 
Figure 3. A georeferenced orthomosaic created when using the drone to map large areas. 701 photos have been merged 
into one. Cleared mines are displayed as red (anti-personnel mines) and blue (anti-tank mines) dots.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
during the war was repaired, and a sense of normality began 
to seep back into the region. 
The Muhamalai minefield has been split up into manage-
able sections based on ground features and previously known 
tracks. The National Mine Action Centre allocated the major-
ity of these sectors, 6.5 sq km (2.5 sq mi), to HALO with na-
tional NGOs, Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH), 
Skavita Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Project (SHARP), 
and the SLA being allocated the remaining area to clear. 
On-site Challenges
Two large villages exist within the mine field. During the 
conflict, these villages were vacated, the infrastructure was 
destroyed, mines and improvised explosive devices (IED) 
were densely laid, and there was significant crossfire that also 
contaminated the land with unexploded ordnance (UXO). 
The humanitarian requirement is immense. While many 
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processing methods, assets, and so on. 
Real-time aerial photography identifies 
obstacles or difficult areas that informs 
and supports the deployment of remote- 
controlled machines as well as their abil-
ity to monitor the time and motion of 
multiple machines when safety distance 
rules make this otherwise impossible.
Second, free mobile apps such as 
Pix4D Capture are being used to re-
motely control the drones and accu-
rately map out large areas by taking 
photographs at set intervals to create 
detailed, georeferenced orthomosaic 
images. The fully-processed compos-
ite image can then be developed using 
GIS software to show the locations of all 
mines and ERW found in the area. This 
is especially useful when analyzing the 
potential for reduction, which is a key 
element of the land release process.
Third, HALO uses drones in 
Muhamalai to meet its monitoring and evaluation commit-
ments. Identifying clear targets and quantifiable outcomes 
that can be broken down using inputs into a logic model 
are essential to the reporting process. Google Earth is an 
excellent free resource that provides accurate imagery and 
allows minefield polygons to be layered onto a satellite im-
agery base layer with linked survey and clearance informa-
tion. It does, however, lack detail of the ground and is not 
updated regularly. While all socioeconomic surveys require 
surveyors to physically visit former minefields and ask re-
spondents how their living situation has changed, drones 
can aid monitoring and evaluation professionals to gain a 
more accurate understanding of land use on former mine-
fields. For example, drone imagery can be used to measure 
and georeference the size and location of land being used for 
post-clearance agriculture.
The ability to use drones as a pre-clearance mapping tool is 
always likely to be vegetation dependent, but in areas of low-
density vegetation, HALO has found drones to be extreme-
ly useful for operational planning and clearance analysis. 
Post-clearance, drones support reporting requirements and 
monitoring of post-clearance development, providing the do-
nors who fund the clearance activities with the most up to 
date imagery of exactly where and how their money has had 
a positive impact on the local population and the economy. 
Further to this, they are an excellent resource for training 
displaced families have been in refugee camps or seeking shel-
ter with relatives for over a decade, the people of Northern Sri 
Lanka can rebuild their homes in a matter of weeks once land 
is cleared and released. For this reason, good management and 
prioritization of clearance to target those resettlement areas 
is essential. 
Currently, HALO deploys 465 staff in 45 manual and 10 
mechanical teams over 6.5 sq km (2.5 sq mi) of Muhamalai. 
Planning, managing, and successfully implementing the de-
ployment of 465 staff across such a large area presents mul-
tiple challenges and complexities. In addition, clearance in 
Muhamalai is arduous due to the extreme levels of metal con-
tamination ranging from large UXO to small metal fragments 
of exploded armored vehicles. As a result, the use of metal de-
tectors is not possible and the entire area requires full excava-
tion by manual or mechanical means.
Implementing Drones
Over the past year, HALO’s operations management team 
have found several uses for drones in Muhamalai. First, HALO 
uses drones to monitor progress and assist in planning for 
the deployment of the clearance teams—in particular for its 
10 mixed-asset mechanical teams. The nature of mechanical 
mine clearance demands constant adaptability as clearance 
progresses. The terrain, vegetation levels, and explosive threats 
constantly change, requiring the use of different bucket types, 
The monthly operations planning meeting. Drone pictures are used as key planning 
tools.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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A Case 721C Wheel Loader drops contaminated soil in a marked inspection lane. Aerial photos enable proactive deployment into 
areas that are best suited for certain assets.
Images courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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The PrimeTech PT-300 D:Mine tiller. Aerial photos enable proactive deployment into areas that are best suited for cer-
tain assets.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
and demonstrations, which are key components for devel-
opment in HALO’s workforce and operational capacity.
Future Uses for HMA
With the international focus shifting quickly away from 
conventional, legacy mine clearance to the new unknown 
of high-risk clearance of IEDs, the requirement for real-
time remote-management tools has increased significant-
ly. Confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) containing large 
amounts of rubble require mechanical clearance of items 
with high-explosive content, and demand much larger safety 
distances and a much more precise and targeted clearance 
approach. Here, drones have the potential to provide excel-
lent imagery that can be used by machine operators or ex-
plosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians to create a 3D 
view of the working area, highlighting obstacles or objects 
that would not otherwise be visible. 
Some operators already use drones to monitor safe-
ty cordons for demolitions and disposals, especially low- 
order techniques (e.g., monitoring a burn to see when it is 
safe to return), but there is definitely scope for this to be-
come best practice. In an operational environment where 
exact clearance techniques are still being developed and 
identifying the threat is key, any additional reconnaissance 
and search tools could prove extremely valuable. 
Drones have proven to be an effective supporting tool to 
HMA clearance in northern Sri Lanka and with further devel-
opments in the way of extended battery life and more ad-
vanced camera systems, this capability will only increase. 
Across the sector, with further input from operators, drone 
technology has the potential to become a standard component 
of HMA programs around the world. 
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The Effects of ERW 
Contamination in Sri Lanka
by Jennifer Dathan [ Action on Armed Violence ]
Returnees arrive to destroyed and overgrown homes in recently cleared land in the Northern Province, Sri Lanka. 
Image courtesy of Jennifer Dathan, AOAV, 2017.
The Sri Lankan Civil War (July 1983–May 2009), be-tween the government and the Tamil Tigers, was a conflict marked by the extensive use of explosive 
weapons. Predominantly affecting the majority-Tamil areas 
in the north and east (Tamil Eelam), the violence left deep 
scars upon the communities in these areas. The land is still 
heavily marked by the legacy of landmines, air-dropped 
bombs, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).
Over the course of 26 years, widespread use of explosive 
weapons is thought to have killed more than 100,000 peo-
ple and left many more injured.1 Many survivors are missing 
limbs, while others are left with shrapnel embedded in their 
bodies, and still more are impacted by post-traumatic stress 
disorders and grief. By the time the civil war came to an end, 
300,000 civilians had been internally displaced, and 145,000 
had sought refuge abroad, where many remain.2 Throughout 
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the areas most heavily impacted, much of the infrastructure lays 
in ruins with at least 350,000 homes damaged or destroyed.2
Unsurprisingly, the long-term socioeconomic impact from 
the widespread use of explosive weapons in this conflict has 
been profound, not least because of the extensive explosive 
contamination of the land. During the conflict, it was estimat-
ed that 650 minefields were created, preventing civilians from 
returning home, accessing land, and rebuilding their lives.3 
When Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) carried out on-
the-ground research in Sri Lanka in December 2017, it be-
came clear that the reverberating harm from that conflict was 
still acutely felt and continues to stifle individual and com-
munity development.4
Socioeconomic Impacts of ERW
With 650 minefields planted during the conflict and limit-
ed clearance of both mines and other ERW able to take place 
before the war came to an end, it is unsurprising that many 
Sri Lankans lost their lives to such devices. Reporting from 
UNICEF and Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor indi-
cate there have been 1,619 civilian casualties in Sri Lanka from 
mines and other ERW since the 1980s, though with report-
ing difficulties during the worst periods of the war it is likely 
to be an underestimate.5 Since the end of the conflict, casual-
ties have decreased with only eight reported casualties in 2015 
and 2016 respectively.5 As recently as September 2018, two 
volunteer deminers were killed in the northern provinces.6 
According to data from the government-run National Mine 
Action Center, there have been 285 people killed or injured 
from mines and other ERW since 2010, though many casual-
ties may go unrecorded in rural areas. 
A large number of civilians and ex-combatants still suffer 
from the effects of explosive contamination. The president of 
the Spinal Cord Injury Association, in the Northern Province, 
told AOAV that an estimated 90 percent of their patient mem-
bers suffered from war-related injuries, from both shelling 
during the war and unexploded ordnance (UXO).7 Much of 
Sri Lanka is not prepared to accommodate those with disabili-
ties, and AOAV spoke with many people who struggled find-
ing employment after their injury.
 The main professions in the impacted areas often revolve 
around manual labor, with approximately 44 percent of young 
people in the Northern Province employed in the informal sector 
in 2014, compared to 35 percent nationally.8 It is understandable 
that many with physical disabilities in the north and east of the 
country find difficulty gaining employment.
Dignity in labor is often a casualty of explosive violence. 
Many more victims and veterans were left struggling with 
unstable part-time work, trying to make ends meet. AOAV 
spoke to one man while he was being fitted for a prosthet-
ic, and he said that his loss of employment and income had 
left him wishing the shell that claimed the lives of his family 
members had also taken his.9 
A return to employment for victims harmed by explosive 
violence is further hampered by the lack of access to pros-
thetics and other medical assistance. It is estimated that 90 
percent of Sri Lanka’s 160,000 amputees lack access to appro-
priate surgical procedures and prosthetic limbs.10 While some 
were able to find consistent work, it was often due to assis-
tance from the diaspora, and though expatriate cash still sus-
tains many in the impacted areas, it has slowed since the end 
of the war.
 In general, post-war Sri Lanka saw a significant economic 
boom, with annual GDP growth at 8–12 percent  between 2010 
and 2012, and an economy that has increased steadily at a rate 
of 3–5 percent in recent years.11 However, the most contami-
nated areas from ERW in Sri Lanka see the lowest shares of 
GDP, and in that time the North’s share of GDP between 2011 
and 2015 decreased.12 Poverty levels are also highest in those 
regions most impacted by explosive violence.13 
Using the Sri Lankan national poverty line of about US$1.50 
per day, the proportion of people in Mullaitivu subsisting on 
this rate was 28.8 percent in 2017, in Mannar it was 20 per-
cent, and in Kilinochchi, 12.7 percent.13 Other districts with 
higher levels of poverty include Batticaloa (19.4 percent) in the 
Eastern Province, which was also highly impacted by the civil 
war, and Monaragala district (20.8 percent) in Uva province.
 Monaragala is the only town not predominantly inhabited 
by Tamils. Moreover, when an international poverty measure 
is applied, the figures rise to 74.4 percent in Mullaitivu, 60.9 
percent in Mannar, and 57.2 percent in Kilinochchi. These 
towns were amongst the most ERW-contaminated areas af-
ter the conflict.14
With a reliance on agricultural work in the region, where 
unemployment is as high as 60 percent in some key north-
ern towns, ERW has been amongst the most serious strains 
on communities in the area.15 A considerable barrier to agri-
culture, ERW prevents access to land where there is a risk of 
contamination, resulting in a loss of income for many. The sit-
uation is so desperate that, despite the danger, some continue 
to use contaminated land—risking their lives and the lives of 
their livestock.
Representatives from The HALO Trust in Kilinochchi ex-
plained to AOAV researchers that cattle still roam through 
minefields, and it is generally these animals that fall victim 
to the explosives. They recounted one incident the previous 
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month where a cow in calf was killed in the Muhamalai mine-
field. This also meant a loss of income for the farmer to whom 
the cow belonged, as well as a significant amount of future 
earnings. Such a loss can present a substantial blow to farmers 
and their potential income; a pregnant cow alone is valued at 
467,000 Sri Lankan rupees (about £2,185 or US$2,857).16
Clearance Challenges 
Despite efforts, clearance remains slow. Given the variety of 
explosive ordnance used—alongside the use of small arms—
the contaminated areas are littered with landmines (includ-
ing improvised mines), unexploded missiles, grenades, and 
other UXO. Shrapnel and casings from exploded ordnance 
Landmine clearance training being conducted in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. 
Image courtesy of Iain Overton, AOAV, 2017.
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HALO representatives show AOAV examples of the types of ordnance cleared in Sri Lanka. 
Image courtesy of Iain Overton, AOAV, 2017.
caused considerable contamination, increasing the difficulty 
for those clearing the land. On the one hand, it means that 
much of the contamination is random and widespread—
without the pattern that may be expected from the conven-
tional use of landmines. Secondly, much of the land must be 
cleared without the use of metal detectors due to the high lev-
els of metal contamination in the soil. Such hindrances slow 
the process considerably.17 
Of the 650 minefields that were in need of clearance, about 
70 remain more than eight years since the end of the conflict, 
though some need reassessment.17 HALO has estimated that 
around 2,500 people were still waiting to resettle on the land that 
remains contaminated, while other areas are needed for agri-
culture and other uses. However, in total, approximately 42,000 
internally displaced persons (IDP) remain due to conflict- 
related impacts, according to statistics from the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre. The rate of return has 
slowed considerably to just 1,669 returnees in 2017.18
Numerous IDPs cannot return home even when the land 
is cleared. For some, their homes have been destroyed, and 
there is little accessible assistance to help them rebuild. In 
addition, due to widespread poverty and unemployment, 
few can afford to rebuild on their own. This poverty has 
been exacerbated by the many years citizens are displaced 
prior to clearance. 
In Vasavilan East, in the Northern Province, returnees ex-
plained how their land had recently been declared mine-free, 
and this meant they were able to return after 20 years of dis-
placement to begin rebuilding. But when they returned to the 
area, what had been their village was now thick with vegeta-
tion, trees had grown through their homes, and the buildings 
were destroyed. With no savings and no support, they worked 
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together to clear the land but struggled to fund and find build-
ing materials.19 
One man, Vijithkanith, in the Northern Province, said his 
father-in-law had recently been killed by ERW on his land 
while lighting a bonfire—the area had been declared mine-
free only months before. Since then, Vijithkanith was con-
cerned about working on his property, which his family relied 
on to survive.19 
Conclusion
The socioeconomic impact from ERW is long-lasting and 
does not end when land is declared mine-free. Many have been 
displaced for generations, leaving the land unattended and 
damaged. Rebuilding takes time and funds, which the major-
ity of IDPs lack. While some of these concerns could be better 
addressed with additional funding and support, the socioeco-
nomic impact from ERW is clear, there is no quick remedy. 
Clearance takes considerable funding, trained personnel, 
and time. In the meantime, civilians must contend with pov-
erty. For the affected communities, redevelopment must focus 
on homes and livelihoods in the most impacted areas. 
Compensation and rehabilitation can ease the burden placed 
on the affected civilians. 
See endnotes page 60
Jennifer Dathan
Researcher
Action on Armed Violence
Jennifer Dathan is a researcher at Action 
on Armed Violence (AOAV), a London-based 
charity that researches and monitors the im-
pact of violence worldwide. Currently she 
is the organization’s lead Data Researcher, 
where her work is primarily focused on ca-
sualty recording and the long-term im-
pacts of explosive weapons. Prior to joining 
AOAV, Dathan spent time at the United Nations Committee for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination after completing her Master of 
Arts in Human Rights, Globalisation and Justice at Keele University.
Map showing the progress of clearance at a HALO base in Kilinochchi, Sri Lanka. 
Image courtesy of Iain Overton, AOAV, 2017.
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R egional cooperation and regional partnerships are an important aspect of creating strong and sustainable humanitarian mine action programs across the globe. 
Challenges and opportunities endemic to a particular region 
are best addressed by the experience and expertise of local or-
ganizations. Facilitating ways to foster information sharing is 
an imperative for the success of regional security goals.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) seeks to support these goals by coordinating work-
shops and trainings in the Central Asian region in order to 
foster a cooperative mechanism among states that would ad-
dress concerns and challenges stemming from the disposal of 
explosive hazards. The Center for International Stabilization 
and Recovery (CISR), through sponsorship from the United 
Opportunities for Regional 
Training and Information Exchange 
Reap Benefits for Central Asia 
by Paige Ober (CISR), Nazira Shozodaeva (OSCE), Takhmina Akhmedova (OSCE), and Suzanne Fiederlein (CISR)
States Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal 
and Abatement (PM/WRA) and in partnership with the 
Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), recently 
completed a Regional Senior Managers’ Course (R-SMC) for 
the South and Central Asian region. As always, building and 
strengthening regional partnerships was a specific topic of 
discussion at the SMC as was the opportunity for participants 
to learn from one another in the classroom. The input from 
these international organizations expands the already signifi-
cant steps that national programs are making in the region.
OSCE Regional Training and Workshops  
Over the past decade the OSCE has undertaken “confidence-
building” as part of its political-military pillar, a system that 
Group photo after the Opening Ceremony of the EOD course, 2017, Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
Image courtesy of OSCE.
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defines its operational scope as a part of an OSCE Confidence 
and Security Building Measure with the objective of devel-
oping and maintaining regular contacts among experts and 
practitioners and their respective institutions in the region. 
The OSCE has addressed mine action within this pillar at 
the strategy and policy level as well as at the technical lev-
el. At the strategic level, the OSCE organizes annual region-
al workshops for participating states in Central Asia. At the 
technical level the OSCE, working with a wide range of do-
nors and implementing partners, coordinated beginning- 
through-advanced level explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
trainings in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, conducted in multi-
ple languages to support participants from the entire region. 
The 2018 annual regional workshop focused on improvised 
explosive device (IED) threat awareness and included all 
Central Asian states, as well as Afghanistan and Ukraine, 
Female participants during the practical part of the EOD course, Lahur Training Centre, Tajikistan.
Image courtesy of OSCE. 
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leading to greater transparency among neighboring states 
and to increased confidence levels between partners.
OSCE Annual Regional Workshops
The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe (OSCE POiD) is 
mandated to assist the Republic of Tajikistan in its efforts to 
ensure security and stability. In order to maintain the coher-
ence of OSCE’s regional approach, close cooperation between 
OSCE POiD and other OSCE field operations in the Central 
Asian region has been ongoing over the past ten years. The 
OSCE facilitates the only initiative addressing explosive haz-
ards issues on a regional level in Central Asia, which include 
topics on unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ex-
plosive ordnance (AXO), landmines, and IEDs, as well as 
other excess, unsecured, and unserviceable engineering mu-
nitions and ordnance. Fostering dialogue through technical 
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cooperation in Central Asia enables the OSCE to support 
Tajikistan and other OSCE Central Asian participating states 
to find innovative approaches and synergies to address con-
cerns and challenges stemming from explosive hazards. In 
support of this goal, the OSCE POiD annually facilitates re-
gional workshops and training activities that aim to raise 
awareness of and enhance common understanding of the con-
cerns, challenges, and needs for proficient explosive hazards 
reduction and response capacities. 
This annual workshop was most recently conducted in 
Astana but has also taken place in Almaty, Bishkek, and 
Dushanbe. The need for the exchange of experiences and best 
practices between relevant ministries and agencies involved 
in explosive hazard reduction is widely acknowledged. The fo-
cus of the workshop over these years was primarily topics like 
cross-border cooperation in mine action, quality and infor-
mation management, challenges to explosive hazards reduc-
tion and response capacities development, and IED threat 
awareness. The workshop provides a platform for sharing 
best practices and lessons learned in the area of explosive 
hazard reduction, as well as international and global experi-
ences. The OSCE POiD annually engages Afghanistan as its 
Asian Partner for Cooperation in the regional workshops. 
Experts from the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination, 
Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, 
as well as the United Nations Mine Action Service office in 
Afghanistan actively contribute to the OSCE POiD regional 
workshops and share their experience in addressing the chal-
lenges stemming from explosive hazards. 
The presence of OSCE Field Offices in all five Central 
Asian participating states enables smooth coordination and 
implementation of the regional workshops and training ini-
tiatives. The OSCE closely cooperates with the Ministry of 
Defense of each participating state in planning and imple-
mentatiing the annual regional workshops. More recently, 
the OSCE began assisting the participating states to in-
crease their technical capacity by coordinating EOD train-
ings for the region.
OSCE EOD Training
The OSCE regional Integrated Cooperation on Explosive 
Hazards (ICExH) program was developed at the request 
of the governmental authorities of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and the Republic of Tajikistan. The program was ini-
tiated in August 2013 and, at that time, the role of Tajikistan 
in hosting regional trainings to address explosive hazards is-
sues was established and recognized by its neighboring coun-
tries. The governments of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and the United States have funded the ICExH.
The overall goal of the ICExH program, more colloquial-
ly known as the EOD training course, is to reduce the threat 
of explosive hazards in interested OSCE participating states 
in Central Asia. This is done through training in EOD ac-
tivities that includes demilitarization of explosive ordnance 
as well as IED disposal. As with the regional workshops, the 
EOD training is conducted through a regional approach with 
the underlying rationale that shared challenges and concerns 
A session during the Regional Workshop 2016, Astana, Kazakhstan.
Image courtesy of OSCE.
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regarding explosive hazards call for innovative approaches 
and synergies.
The EOD training courses through the ICExH program 
began in May 2014. From May 2014 to May 2017, a total of 
25 trainings took place. The trainings are offered in two 
languages, Russian and Tajik/Dari. Altogether, 180 train-
ees from Afghanistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan attended one of the 
25 implemented trainings. 
It became evident by the end of 2014 that the training cen-
ter infrastructure needed to be upgraded in order to enable 
a proper training environment. It also became obvious that 
continuing to build the national capacity and expertise of 
Tajikistan within the domain of explosive hazards demand-
ed institutionalization of the EOD training course under the 
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan (MoD RT). 
The experience gained in the initial period of project im-
plementation confirmed the MoD RT would be able to ade-
quately support a training center and to one day integrate the 
training center into the formalized education system of the 
MoD RT. The latter is especially important as it allows sus-
tainability of training results and enables efficient transfer of 
training tasks from the OSCE project to the national author-
ities. Subsequently, the concept of the “Regional Explosive 
Hazards Training Centre of the MoD RT” was established 
with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between 
the OSCE POiD and the MoD RT in November 2017. 
By the end of 2020, OSCE POiD’s ICExH program aims to 
increase international and regional recognition, ensure the 
sustainability of results achieved so far, and enable long-term 
benefits for the host country, interested states in Central Asia, 
and other regional partners. The Regional Explosive Hazards 
Training Centre will provide an internationally recognized 
platform for training instructors and explosive hazard spe-
cializations in Central Asia. The training center also provides 
the key venue for a technical level dialogue through exchange 
of experiences and best practices, as well as military training 
and educational cooperation among Central Asian countries. 
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) team leader briefing the participants on battle area clearance procedures, Regional 
Workshop 2017, Chorcharogh, Gharm, Tajikistan.
Image courtesy of OSCE.
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The Regional Senior Managers’ Course 
Through the annual regional workshops and the EOD 
training course maintained through the ICExH program, 
the OSCE offers venues for the entire region to engage explo-
sive hazards issues on both the strategic and technical levels. 
Through the Regional Senior Managers’ Course, CISR com-
bines the strategic and technical into a single integrated three-
week regional training. 
The Regional Senior Manager’s Course is in its fourth it-
eration, building upon the Global Senior Managers’ Courses 
held on the James Madison University campus since 2004. The 
first Regional SMC was held in 2014 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 
in partnership with TNMAC and working with a number of 
other organizations active in the country’s mine action pro-
gram. Since then, the regional course was held in Vietnam 
(2015) in partnership with the Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation and the Association for the Empowerment of 
Persons with Disabilities, and in Croatia (2017) with the 
Croatian Mine Action Centre. 
In 2018, the R-SMC returned to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, up-
dated and adapted with a name change to the Regional SMC 
in Conventional Weapons Destruction, in accordance with 
the variety of issues with which participants’ programs are 
engaged in their countries. In planning and implementing 
the 2018 R-SMC for South and Central Asia, CISR once again 
partnered with TNMAC, worked closely with the OSCE, and 
collaborated with a large number of nongovernmental orga-
nizations, international organizations, and Tajikistan govern-
mental organizations contributing to the collective effort to 
make the country safe from explosive hazards.
For the first time, the course welcomed participants from 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, in addition to participants 
from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan. To support the 
Central Asian participants, simultaneous translation into 
Russian was coordinated for classroom sessions and field 
visits, and all written material from the application process 
through the final stages of the course were translated into 
Russian. By taking the time to adequately plan months in ad-
vance, CISR was able to create an environment in which par-
ticipants who shared no common language could learn from 
lecturers and each other on topics ranging from business 
management skills to technical CWD topics. Indeed, one of 
the most valuable parts of the course are the carefully con-
structed group activities that challenge participants to engage 
with scenarios and problems they or their programs are like-
ly to face and to work with one another to solve these issues, 
thus creating the environment necessary to nurture coopera-
tion and understanding.
A central theme of every SMC is an emphasis on partnerships 
and relationship building amongst participants, programs, 
Visit to the TNMAC Offices: R-SMC participants share experiences and learn from the experiences of Tajikistan on a visit to the 
TNMAC offices.
Image courtesy of CISR.
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Visit to WAD site: On a field visit to a weapons and ammunition disposal site, technical experts from FSD demonstrate to R-SMC par-
ticipants their method of small arms ammunition destruction through burning.
Image courtesy of CISR.
and regional offices with the objective of fostering cross- 
border information sharing, expanding technical support, 
and coordinating efforts efficiently across a region. The pro-
cess of planning for an R-SMC requires partnership build-
ing in itself, and CISR is always grateful for the cooperation 
of partner organizations. In this course, Norwegian People’s 
Aid, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, the OSCE, the 
Union of Sappers of Tajikistan, and the Tajikistan Ministry 
of Defense Humanitarian De-mining Group were integral 
to the course instruction, providing special guest technical 
speakers and offering field demonstrations. In addition, the 
OSCE assisted in coordinating communications with many 
of the Central Asian participants, assisting them with appli-
cations and playing an important role in strengthening the 
diversity of the course. 
Beyond the survey, clearance, and ammunition dispos-
al demonstrations at the TNMAC training center and at 
the weapons and ammunition disposal site at the MoD RT 
training facility at Lahur, the course participants also ben-
efitted from visits to the State Enterprise Orthopedic Plant 
of Dushanbe City and the Research Institute for Expertise 
and Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, orga-
nized by TNMAC and local United Nations Development 
Programme staff working with TNMAC in support of sur-
vivor assistance programs.
Above all, the course could not have been completed nor 
even imagined without the assistance of the TNMAC staff 
members who provided on-the-ground support in plan-
ning and hosting the course. From organizing translation 
of the course materials to arranging group dinners and ac-
tivities, TNMAC was the linchpin that kept the course run-
ning smoothly. TNMAC has grown as a national program 
and through the collaboration among regional partners, 
has strengthened its own capacity. Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 
Director of TNMAC states “As a result of on-going mine ac-
tion operations and continuing capacity building efforts, 
Tajikistan has transformed its role from an importer to ex-
porter of technical knowledge and skills in mine action in the 
region and beyond.”1 
Within the scope of the R-SMC, TNMAC brought technical 
as well as policy knowledge to the course, teaching modules 
and arranging demonstrations. TNMAC’s capacity to sup-
port technical aspects of the course were recently expound-
ed through their cooperation with the OSCE in opening the 
Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre with the MoD 
RT. TNMAC also handled all of the national government 
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worked on projects related to victim assis-
tance, International Mine Action Standards, 
mine-risk education (managing the ERW 
Awareness in Schools project in Jordan), 
mine-action in Latin America, mine-action database systems (spe-
cializing in casualty data) and program evaluation. As coordinator of 
management training for CISR, Dr. Fiederlein directs the ERW/Mine 
Action Senior Managers’ Courses, both those conducted at JMU and 
those implemented on a regional basis. She holds graduate degrees 
in Latin American studies (M.A., Univ. of Texas) and political science 
(Ph.D., Univ. of Arizona), and has served on the faculty of James 
Madison University and Virginia Commonwealth University. 
coordination necessary to host a group of senior level man-
agers from across the region, demonstrating the maturity of 
the program within the country.
Conclusion
Vital to the planning, coordination, and execution of 
CISR’s R-SMC are the relationships it shares with skilled 
partners across the globe. In Central Asia, the OSCE and 
TNMAC work together to strengthen regional knowledge 
and technical skills, as well as transparency and trust. As 
TNMAC demonstrates , investment by international orga-
nizations in both strategic and technical capacity across a 
region leads not only to stronger cross-border relations and 
information exchange, but also to greater capacities within 
national programs. 
As the OSCE and CISR continue their regional-level in-
terventions, and as national programs mature, we can look 
forward to a more integrated approach to explosive haz-
ards management across the Central Asian region with 
programs learning from one another and assisting each 
other as required. 
See endnotes page 60
Participants in the 2018 Regional SMC in Conventional Weapons Destruction.
Image courtesy of CISR.
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Following the recent political rapprochement between the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in March 2018, a joint commission was created to inves-
tigate the minefields along the Tajik-Uzbek border and sched-
ule their clearance.1 The Uzbek government first expressed the 
intention to remove the landmines along its borders in 2004 
and later reported the start of unilateral demining operations 
in 2005 by the Uzbek military.2–4 Less than three years later, 
Uzbek demining teams had reportedly cleared 95 percent of 
the minefields along the Tajik border.5 However, this has not 
been verified by independent organizations, and civilians still 
fall victim to landmines in that region.6
The border between the countries is still disputed and re-
mains mostly unmarked, making it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to determine precisely on which side of the border mines 
Demining the Tajik-Uzbek Border:
What Have We Learned From 
the Tajik Experience?
by Henrique Garbino [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ] and Erkin Huseinov 
[ UNDP Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme ]
were laid. As recently as 2001, Uzbek forces laid anti-personnel 
landmines along the still-disputed border with Tajikistan, re-
portedly to prevent incursions from Islamic militants operat-
ing in the area.7 While it is likely that most of the minefields 
were laid on the Uzbek side of the border, Tajik authorities 
consider the overall area to have a “high degree of mine risk 
on both sides of the border.”8 
The Tajik-Uzbek border is approximately 1,230 km (764.3 
mi) long and runs along 17 districts in eastern and north-
ern Tajikistan. According to the Tajik statistical agency, 
there are about three million people living in these districts, 
who are mostly engaged in agriculture.9 The Uzbek govern-
ment claims that landmines were planted in the mountain-
ous border areas, which are difficult to monitor and control. 
However, according to a 2004 report from the Integrated 
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Figure 1. Mine victims on the Tajik-Uzbek border in comparison with the rest of Tajikistan.6
All figures courtesy of the authors.
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Regional Information Networks (IRIN), experts suggest up 
to 70 percent of the Tajik-Uzbek border might have been 
mined, including the flatlands.2
While mine clearance has been conducted in central 
Tajikistan and along the Tajik-Afghan border, no clearance has 
occurred along the disputed Tajik-Uzbek border. At least 157 
people have experienced mine accidents along the Tajik-Uzbek 
border, accounting for roughly half of all mine casualties in 
Tajikistan since 1999.6 Despite the risk posed by anti-personnel 
mines, no land release activity has taken place on the Tajik side 
except for limited impact surveys.10 To date, the exact locations 
of the minefields are unknown to Tajik authorities.8 
Humanitarian demining in the region clearly presents 
many technical and political challenges. However, the experi-
ences accumulated from almost fifteen years of mine action in 
other regions of the country offer many opportunities. Tajik 
national authorities, together with implementing partners, 
have established the necessary structures and coordination 
mechanisms for effective mine action in Tajikistan.
Moreover, the country has provided examples of bilateral 
and regional cooperation initiatives. For instance, the Tajik-
Afghan cross-border mine clearance project implemented 
by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has worked 
to address the mine contamination in Afghanistan’s Darwaz 
province. In addition, several regional explosive ordnance dis-
posal (EOD) courses were supported by the Organization for 
Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office in Dushanbe. 
The courses enhanced regional EOD capability and strength-
ened defense cooperation in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Understanding the Problem
Even though the minefields, which are reportedly defen-
sive in nature, are thought to be mostly on the Uzbek side 
of the border, there have been a series of mine accidents in 
Tajik-claimed territory.6 A great part of the problem lies in 
the fact that the Tajik-Uzbek border is still disputed and 
is mostly unmarked.11 Moreover, minefields or individual 
mines might have been moved due to natural phenomena, 
such as heavy rainfall, landslides, avalanches, or earth-
quakes, or even local citizens might have manually moved 
individual mines.8,12 
From 2011 to 2015, the Tajikistan National Mine Action 
Centre (TNMAC) coordinated mixed teams that con-
ducted non-technical survey missions to assess the risk of 
Figure 2. Mine accidents along the Tajik-Uzbek border.6
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contamination in the ten districts bordering Uzbekistan in 
Sughd province. The surveys registered 82 mine accidents and 
60 suspected hazardous areas in six of those districts.6 The 
lack of demarcation makes it easy for locals, often looking for 
fodder, firewood, or to cross the border to meet family mem-
bers, to stray across the minefields.8 TNMAC officially con-
cluded that minefields were at least 50 m (54.7 yd) into the 
Uzbek side of the border; however, three accidents occurred 
in Tajik territory.13 In the first accident, an explosive device 
was likely moved by mudslides from the mountains and then 
collected by children from the nearby village. The second and 
third accidents occurred in the same area and within a couple 
of hours when a shepherd stepped on a landmine (most like-
ly an OZM-72) in territory that had previously been cleared 
by Uzbek deminers, and when his grandson came to help, the 
grandson fell victim to another landmine. It should be not-
ed here that TNMAC’s conclusions are somewhat subjective 
because they did not have enough access to the minefields due 
to border security concerns.6,14 At least six other districts bor-
dering Uzbekistan remain to be surveyed.15
Laid according to Russian military doctrine, Uzbek mine-
fields are likely to be recorded, mapped, and mostly com-
prised of anti-personnel mines.16,17 Based on impact survey 
reports and national averages, it is possible to estimate an ini-
tial confirmed hazardous area of roughly 3.3 sq km (1.27 sq 
mi), which is calculated to take approximately three years for 
full clearance.18 When compared with the initial assessment 
proposed by IRIN in 2004, the available data on mine acci-
dents along the Tajik-Uzbek border suggest a completely dif-
ferent picture. It is estimated that only 3 percent, or 35.8 km 
(22.25 mi), of the border is mined.19 One should also take into 
account that the estimation is based on casualty data, thus 
likely to be underreported, and that not all districts along the 
border have been surveyed.
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Figure 3. Mine accidents by altitude and distance from the border.6
Figure 4. Tajik-Uzbek border elevation profile.20
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Even though no mine clearance operation has taken place 
on the Tajik side of the border, the National Strategy of the 
Republic of Tajikistan on Humanitarian Mine Action ac-
knowledges the mine threat in the region. Accordingly, 
TNMAC has targeted the districts of Panjakent, Ayni, Asht, 
Isfara, Shahriston, and Konibodom for mine risk education 
and victim assistance programs.8
Mine clearance in the region is likely to be affected by ex-
treme temperatures, heavy rainfall, and landslides in spring 
and summer, and snow in winter. Limited capacity for casu-
alty evacuation further limits mine clearance activities. As a 
result, manual demining teams are only able to work about 
nine months per year in Tajikistan, without accounting for 
rest, recreation, and bad weather.11 In central Tajikistan as 
well as along the Tajik-Afghan border, demining teams work, 
on average, less than 130 days per year. Our findings indicate 
that around 50 percent of the minefields on the Tajik-Uzbek 
border were laid in flat areas and would allow for mechanical 
demining and dog detection technologies, which can consid-
erably increase the efficiency of demining operations.6,11
The involvement of international organizations in the de-
mining effort could help facilitate the interaction between the 
two governments; however, bureaucracy and rigid decision- 
making structures often delay and sometimes impede the 
work of these organizations in supporting the mine action 
program in Tajikistan.17 Furthermore, recent developments in 
international funding for the Tajik mine action program sug-
gest donor fatigue.21
Cross-border Cooperation
In spite of the many challenges presented above, the Tajik 
experience suggests there are many opportunities for de-
mining the border with Uzbekistan. Since 2003, TNMAC 
has developed national mine action standards, created a 
national mine action center, established working relation-
ships with its implementing partners, trained personnel to 
undertake quality assurance and land release up to inter-
national standards, and implemented information manage-
ment mechanisms.22–24
Moreover, previous victim assistance exchange programs 
and the current cross-border operations in Afghanistan have 
shown that TNMAC is willing and able to cooperate with re-
gional counterparts.25,26 Largely boosted by OSCE, Tajikistan 
has become a key actor in supporting regional cooperation for 
capacity building and information sharing in mine action and 
explosive hazards clearance.27
Even though political relations between Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan have been fragile at best, demining their shared bor-
ders may present a good opportunity for closer cooperation in 
security issues. Furthermore, experienced implementing part-
ners could be tasked to carry out mine clearance in the region as 
an independent neutral third party.28 Finally, the successful start 
of a cooperation program between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
could lead to renewed donor interest in the region. 
See endnotes page 60
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Figure 5. Donor funding for the Tajikistan mine action program from 2010 to 2017.6
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DRONES AND “BUTTERFLIES”: 
A LOW-COST UAV SYSTEM FOR RAPID 
DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF 
UNCONVENTIONAL MINEFIELDS
by Timothy S. de Smet,Ph.D., Alex Nikulin,Ph.D., William Frazer, Jasper Baur, Jacob Abramowitz,  
Daniel Finan, Sean Denara, Nicholas Aglietti, and Gabriel Campos  
[ Department of Geological Sciences & Environmental Studies, Binghamton University ]
Aerially-deployed plastic landmines in post-conflict na-tions present unique detection and disposal challenges. Their small size, randomized distribution during de-
ployment, and low-metal content make these mines more difficult 
to identify using traditional methods of electromagnetic mine de-
tection. Perhaps the most notorious of these mines is the Soviet-
era PFM-1 “butterfly mine,” widely used during the decade-long 
Soviet-Afghan conflict between 1979 and 1989. Predominantly 
used by the Soviet forces to block otherwise inaccessible moun-
tain passages, many PFM-1 minefields remain in place due to the 
high associated costs of access and demining. While the total 
number of deployed PFM-1 mines in Afghanistan is poorly doc-
umented, PFM-1 landmines make up a considerable percentage 
of the estimated 10 million landmines remaining in place across 
Afghanistan. Their detection and disposal presents a unique logis-
tical challenge for largely the same reasons that their deployment 
was rationalized in inaccessible and sparsely populated areas of 
the country. 
In an attempt to address the PFM-1 challenge, researchers at 
Binghamton University developed a protocol based on remote as-
sessment of unique thermal signatures associated with the PFM-1 
and its aluminum cassette casing. In field tests, researchers were able 
to successfully identify and recover all elements of a randomized 
PFM-1 minefield. While this methodology cannot fully replace tra-
ditional manual clearance to categorically declare an area clear of 
mines, remote thermal detection of PFM-1 fields allows accurate as-
sessment of minefield presence, orientation, and any overlap between 
two or more minefields. Available low-cost commercial UAV plat-
forms equipped with thermal cameras allows accurate assessment 
of minefield presence, orientation, and potential minefield overlap. 
Constraining these parameters can significantly reduce search areas 
in wide-area assessment (> 5 acres/hour at cm pixel resolution) of at-
risk regions, potentially reducing associated risks and costs.
As landmines evolved from a weapon of strategic warfare dur-
ing large-scale armed conflicts of the 20th century to weapons 
of modern unconventional warfare, their technological devel-
opment followed two complementary vectors: a calculated re-
duction of explosive charge and a reduction in mass and metal 
content. Deployed from the air, either via special artillery shells 
or from specially equipped aircraft, the PFM-1 contains few metal 
parts. Although the individual mines can be detected with labori-
ous metal detecting surveys the minefields can be hard to detect. 
Figure 1. KSF-1 dispersal cassette and PFM-1 landmine.
All figures courtesy of the authors.
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With its detonator fully encased in the mine’s polyethylene body 
and its liquid explosive charge not containing any metallic shrap-
nel elements, remnant PFM-1 minefields are poorly defined in 
terms of their location and orientation. Moreover, if deployed 
in a remote area, they can remain in place for decades follow-
ing the cessation of hostilities, as is the case in Afghanistan.1 The 
irreversible detonator of the PFM-1 is set to react to cumulative 
pressure of roughly 25 pounds, earning it another unfortunate 
nickname: “the toy mine.” As a result, many of its victims are 
children who happen to find remnant PFM-1 mines and play with 
them as toys until tragedy strikes.2 
Demining experts working in Afghanistan estimate that there 
are currently more than 10 million landmines remaining in the 
country.3 The vast majority of these are anti-personnel mines de-
ployed during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), like the PFM-
1 and PMN. At the height of the conflict, Soviet forces dropped 
as many as 100,000 mines per month and with no existing docu-
mentation as to specific areas or number of mines deployed dur-
ing individual missions.4 These minefields largely remain in place 
because the mines were dispersed by helicopters in remote areas 
that are difficult to access, like mountain passes that are logistical-
ly critical for transportation. The minefields are difficult to detect 
and individual mines are dangerous to remove relying on tradi-
tional electromagnetic (EM) methods of detection and physical 
spike-probing.5 Furthermore, even when a PFM-1 field is locat-
ed, removing these mines is painstakingly slow and exceptionally 
expensive; removal estimates are as high as US$1,000 per mine.6 
Critically, in remote areas of Afghanistan, large-scale demining 
efforts are not likely to happen in the foreseeable future due to 
high-logistical costs and ongoing conflict. 
 
METHODOLOGY
We saw the challenge of detecting the plastic design of the PFM-
1 as an opportunity to test a different approach to detection and 
identification. Our approach is based on the mine’s long-wave in-
frared (LWIR) thermal heat signature, which contrasts greatly 
with the LWIR signatures of the surrounding host environment 
and the aluminum casing of the PFM-1 dispenser.7 In a recent 
study, we demonstrated that a thermal camera mounted on a low-
cost, commercial unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) could success-
fully detect the presence of a PFM-1 from an elevation of 10 meters 
above ground level. We further demonstrated that the orientation 
of the PFM-1 plays little role in our ability to detect these devic-
es.8 In this article, we present the results of a series of field studies 
that demonstrate our ability to detect and identify all elements of a 
dispersed PFM-1 minefield. We complement our findings with re-
sults of stationary experiments meant to identify the optimal en-
vironmental conditions for the application of this methodology.
Figure 2. 3DR Solo quadcopter with FLIR Vue Pro R camera attached to a fixed mount.
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Figure 3. Trials 1 and 2, photogrammetry of cobble environment with PFM-1 landmines circled in red and the KSF-1 cassette casing el-
ements circled in yellow in the second image.
Figure 4. Sand environment for trials 3 and 4 with 9 PFM-1 mines and KSF-1 cassette casing elements.
52
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss3/1
ISSUE 22.3 @ NOVEMBER 2018 53
DYNAMIC UAV TRIAL
The aerial dispersal mechanism of the PFM-1 results in ellip-
soidal minefields with dimensions governed by the angle of the 
initial ballistic trajectory with a range of 18 to 20 meters by 8 
to 10 meters. In mountainous areas the size and footprint of the 
minefield has likely been dynamically changing over freeze-thaw 
cycles since the mines’ initial emplacement. The minefield con-
sists of old intact and inert mines in three element categories: 
18 PFM-1 mines, each of which consists of two thin aluminum 
KSF-1 rails and a thick aluminum KSF-1 pad (Figure 1). In our 
prior work, we demonstrated that each of these elements has a 
unique thermal signature, which is largely independent of orien-
tation.8 For our series of field trials, we dispersed these elements 
randomly within a 20 by 10 meters test area in a grassy field, to 
mimic the grassy lowlands these mines could end up in after win-
ter melt mobilizes them, and have previously conducted research 
on rocky mountainous background geology.7,8 We conducted 
a blind test in the grassy courtyard of the Science 1 building at 
Binghamton University, New York, on 7 August 2018. This was a 
truly blind trial, as the mines were randomly dispersed to mimic 
an ellipsoidal minefield the day before so they could reach ther-
mal equilibrium with their background environment before our 
early morning trials.
Thermal infrared data was collected with a FLIR Vue Pro R 
camera, which measures LWIR in the 7.5 to 13.5 micrometers 
wavelength spectral band. The camera was mounted on a com-
mercially available 3DR Solo quadcopter UAV and flown at an 
elevation of 10 meters above ground level for a high-resolution 
ground sampling distance of 1.2 centimeters (i.e., the distance be-
tween proximate pixel centers as measured from the ground). We 
complemented thermal imaging with a visual light aerial photog-
raphy flight at 10 meters altitude with a DJI Phantom 4 Pro 20 
megapixel camera (Figure 2), which resulted in 0.24 centimeter 
per pixel resolution photogrammetry model orthomosaic. An or-
thomosaic is a georeferenced image product mosaiked from many 
individual photos into one single image. 
STATIONARY CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT TRIALS
We complemented our dynamic field trials with a series of 
stationary experiments to assess the impact of environmental 
Figure 5. (a) Visible light photogrammetry model from Phantom 4 Professional, and (b) apparent temperature thermal orthomosaic from FLIR 
Vue Pro R from 8:16—8:23 a.m. flight. In the upper left-hand corner, the stationary experimental sets can be seen.
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conditions and sediment cover on our ability to reliably discern 
mines from host geology. Four 24-hour experiments were con-
ducted to test the effects of ground composition and water satu-
ration on the detection of intact inert PFM-1 mines among host 
geology; the mines were left out for over one year and no notice-
able deterioration of the mine occurred due to UV exposure. In 
the first two trials, five randomly dispersed PFM-1s along with an 
aluminum KSF-1 casing were placed in 0.915 by 1.07 by 0.15 me-
ter sand boxes filled with cobble-sized stones that ranged from 64 
to 256 millimeters (Figure 3). In trials three and four, nine hori-
zontally oriented mines, (three placed on the surface with the KSF 
casing, three at a 1 centimeter depth and three at a 2 centimeter 
depth) were placed in the sandbox filled with sand less than 10 
millimeters (Figure 4). Data was collected using the FLIR VUE Pro 
R thermal infrared camera, with spectral bands between 7.5 and 
13.5 micrometers, with a resolution of 640 megapixels attached to 
a 3DR Solo, propped 2 meters above the sandboxes. Thermal in-
frared imagery data was taken every 15 seconds throughout the 
24-hour duration starting at 12:00 a.m. in order to capture the 
optimal time of day to detect the PFM-1s based on differences in 
the thermal inertia of the PFM-1s and surrounding environment.
RESULTS 
DYNAMIC UAV TRIAL 
The results of our dynamic field trials are presented in Figures 
5–7. In order to spatially control the resulting photogrammetry 
model orthomosaics to the centimeter, we placed four aluminum 
ground control points (GCP) at the perimeter of the approximately 
10 by 20 meter area. Shiny aluminum has a low emissivity and can 
easily be detected by a thermal camera, which can be seen in Figure 
3; however, the low apparent temperatures are radiometrically- 
inaccurate. The location of the GCPs was measured with a sub-
centimeter Trimble Geo 7X Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS). We also visibly geolocated the randomly placed PFM-1 
landmines with the same GNSS after conducting the thermal sur-
veys. Anecdotally, we were only able to visually locate 15 of the 18 
landmines from the cassette on our first walking pass of the area. 
We likely missed the mines upon our first visual inspection be-
cause their dull, green plastic body blends in with the long grass. 
The fact that we were unable to locate all of the 18 newly-deployed 
mines on a first pass in our 10 by 20 meter elliptical minefield 
highlights that this was a true blind trial and the great difficulty 
Figure 6. Apparent temperature from (a) 8:16-8:23 a.m. flight and (c) 9:18-9:24 a.m. flight before and after direct heating from sunlight, and 
(b) visible light color photos over the same area. 
Figure 7. Close up of a single PFM-1 mine apparent temperature at (a) 8:16–8:23 a.m. flight and (c) 9:18–9:24 a.m. flight, and (b) visible light 
color photos over the same area. Aluminum KSF-1 casing can be seen in the top left and PFM-1 landmine in the bottom right.
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involved in visually locating these small mines in the field even 
when their general location is known.
In our datasets, we were consistently able to visibly detect both 
the PFM-1 landmines and the KSF-1 cassette casing elements by 
inspecting the correlation of visible light and thermal infrared im-
aging in our field trials. Although the sun rose at 6:03 a.m. on the 
morning of 7 August 2018, the landmines still could not be seen 
at our 8:16–8:23 a.m. flight (Figure 5b) because a nearby build-
ing blocked direct sunlight from reaching the courtyard until ap-
proximately 8:30 a.m. Although the landmines themselves are 
not visible in the flights before direct heating from the sun, the 
KSF-1 casing elements are clearly visible in the center of the simu-
lated elliptical minefield as low apparent temperature anomalies 
(Figure 5b). Upon closer inspection, the KSF-1 casing elements 
maintain their radiometrically low apparent temperature because 
of their low emissivity, even after exposure to direct sunlight heat-
ing (Figure 6). The landmine’s body and wing in Figure 6 (bottom 
right) heats up faster than its background during early heating 
from direct sun exposure. Individual PFM-1 landmines that are 
invisible before direct sun exposure (Figure7a) rapidly heat and 
can be detected in both visible (Figure 7b) and thermal (Figure 7c) 
imagery by their distinctive shape and thermal properties.
STATIONARY CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT TRIALS
In all stationary trials, the aluminum KSF casing was highly 
distinguishable in both cobble and sand environments and high 
and low relative moisture. This is important because the KSF cas-
ing is an easily detectable indicator of an area impacted by PFM-1s, 
likely within a 10 by 20 meter range; although as stated previous-
ly, in mountainous areas these mines can become mobilized after 
snowmelt. These controlled experiments provide insight regard-
ing variables associated with plastic landmine detection using 
thermal infrared imaging.
TIME OF DAY
For differential apparent thermal inertia (DATI) data, PFM-1s 
were most visible 30–120 minutes after sunrise and sunset.4 For 
raw thermal data (trials 3 and 4), PFM-1s were most visible at peak 
sunlight time from 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. (Figure 8).
HOST ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
The cobble environment of trials 1 and 2 made detection of 
PFM-1s more difficult, as the cobbles increased the likelihood 
of false positives (Figures 9 and 10) and is most like the remote 
areas where these are dispersed in Afghanistan. In the sand 
environments of trials 3 and 4 (Figures 11, 12, Table 1), the mines 
were easily distinguishable in the thermal conductivity and inertia 
dataset due to extremely low chance of false positives, and the 
size difference between the PFM-1s and sand environment. This 
shows PFM-1s are easiest to detect in fine-grain environments 
like sand, silt, or clay and most difficult to detect in cobble 
size environments where the grain size is similar to the mines 
Figure 8. Temperature variation throughout the day for controlled environment trials.
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(assuming all thermal properties of the 
environment remain constant).
MOISTURE CONTENT
High moisture content in the sand en-
vironment during trial 4 (Figure 12) 
greatly improved the visibility of the sur-
face mines in the sand environment.5 
Compared to trials 1 and 3, trials 2 and 
4 had higher moisture content (with tri-
al 4 having the highest because the sand 
more readily retained moisture than the 
cobbles), increasing the temperature dif-
ference and differential apparent thermal 
inertia between the sand and the PFM-1s.
DEPTH OF BURIAL
Mines buried at depths of 1 or 2 centi-
meters in trials 3 and 4 failed to emit heat 
signatures detectable with our equipment. 
In Figures 11 and 12, none of the 12 bur-
ied mines can be identified at any depth 
below the surface due to the layer of sand 
above the mines having dominate thermal 
properties on the surface, muting out the 
mines’ thermal signatures below.
ORIENTATION OF SURFACE-LAID MINES
Statistically, the most likely orientation 
of the mine for a flat surface is lying flat 
horizontally as shown in sandbox trials 3 
and 4 (Figure 4). This proves useful for de-
tectability in that the flat orientation has 
signature shape and size that can be iden-
tified. Thermally, the most visible part of 
the PFM-1 is the aluminum cap; when the cap is visible, the mine 
is easier to detect than when it is not visible. Additionally, orien-
tations that display maximum surface area of both the fluid body 
and the thin wing were more distinguishable from the surround-
ing environment, as each has separate thermal properties.
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The use of cost- and time-efficient, remote-sensing techniques 
to locate direct evidence of PFM-1 contamination from UAVs has 
great potential that warrants further study. Our preliminary re-
sults indicate that the proposed remote-sensing methodology can 
positively and immediately impact efforts to identify remote high-
altitude areas, where aerially deployed plastic mines were most 
commonly used. In these settings, the design of the PFM-1 and its 
military role as an efficient tool to restrict and deny the use of re-
mote passages work against it in terms of our ability to detect and 
identify PFM-1 minefields. In other words, remote thermal detec-
tion of PFM-1 minefields would work particularly well in remote 
areas that are otherwise free of anthropogenic waste and combat 
artifacts. These are precisely the areas that most PFM-1 mines re-
main in place in Afghanistan. Conversely, this method would have 
limited use in urban areas or in areas where plastic and metal de-
bris would produce prohibitive false positives.
We are careful to point out that remote assessment of PFM-1 
contamination should be seen as a non-technical and technical 
survey tool for initial assessment of mine presence and minefield 
orientation, rather than a methodology to conclusively declare 
an area free of landmines. It is possible that a PFM-1 minefield 
Figure 9. Trial 1, differential apparent thermal inertia taken every 15 minutes of PFM-1s and 
KSF-1 casing in cobble environment 1 September 2017 (°C/hour).
Figure 10. Trial 2, differential apparent thermal inertia taken every 30 minutes of PFM-1s 
and KSF-1 casing in cobble environment 4 September 2017 (°C/hour).
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may not contain the full 18 mines, as an-
ecdotal evidence suggests that PFM-1 
mines may become mobile due to weath-
er (being carried downslope after win-
ter thaw). Furthermore, it is highly 
likely that not all mines can be detected 
in a specific field due to a unique orien-
tation, sediment cover, UV exposure, or 
other unknown factor that might mask 
a given PFM-1. Finally, it is possible that 
a PFM-1 minefield may contain other 
types of mines within its boundaries that 
are not discerned by remote thermal as-
sessment. Moreover, low emissivity alu-
minum objects of similar size and shape 
could cause false alarms. However, de-
spite these shortcomings, remote thermal 
and visible light assessment would sig-
nificantly limit the search zone in wide-
area assessments of areas impacted by 
past deployments of PFM-1 landmines. 
The low cost, small mass, and relatively 
easy-to-operate system demonstrates sig-
nificant potential for the NGO demining 
toolkit. Future research on the detec-
tion of the PFM-1 and other similar anti- 
personnel mines will consider a greater 
suite of environmental variables (diurnal 
temperature variation, altitude, host ge-
ology, UAV flight altitude, mine orienta-
tion) at larger–scale, controlled test sites. 
This methodology shows great potential 
for wide-area assessment to rapidly locate 
remote minefields for subsequent clear-
ance. Eventually, we hope to develop a ful-
ly autonomous system of UAVs that can 
use machine-learning algorithms (e.g., 
supervised learning classification) to de-
tect and remove anti-personnel mines in 
difficult terrain without requiring human exposure. 
The ultimate goal of this project is designing and implementing a 
low-cost landmine detection technology that we intend to transfer to 
NGOs focused on demining efforts in post-conflict countries. We an-
ticipate that the technology and knowledge base that emerge as a re-
sult of our ongoing research efforts will allow us to structure a training 
program focused on efficient and safe deployment of drone-based land-
mine detection platforms in different environments. This project aims 
Figure 11. Trials 3 thermal images of PFM-1s and KSF casing in sand environment at 12:00 
PM October 5th and 31st
Figure 12. Trials 4, thermal image of PFM-1s and KSF casing in sand environment at 12:00 
p.m. October 31st.
ID OBJECT TEMP °C AVG
A1 PFN-1: Thin Wing 30.39
A2 PFN-1: Fluid Wing 28.21
A3 PFM-1: Aluminum Cap 24.09
B1 KSF: Cap 12.81
C1 KSF: Casing 13.45
D1 PFM-1 Thin Wing 5.7
D2 PFM-1: Fluid Wing 6.5
D3 PFM-1: Aluminum Cap 3.33
E1 KSF: Cap -6.07
F1 KSF: Casing -16.75
Table 1 (right). Trial 3 and 4 average apparent temperatures of labeled 
objects seen in Figures 11 and 12.
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to increase the efficiency and decrease the risk associated with 
landmine removal to allow previously inaccessible minefields to 
be located. In this effort, we hope to positively impact commu-
nities that remain divided by an artificially introduced threat to 
their lives and future development.
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Smoke billows skyward as homes and buildings are shelled in the city of Homs, Syria.
Photo courtesy of UN Photo/David Manyua.
Middle East
With a long list of modern conﬂ icts, the Middle East continues to experience insecurity as well as 
numerous explosive hazards. The Iraq War; civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen; the rise and fall 
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and multiple insurgencies all contributed to regional 
instability and extensive explosive contamination. How are organizations adapting to the challenge 
of working in such complex and dangerous environments? How have clearance operations adapted 
to the unique urban environments in the Middle East? Is clearance by 2025 an achievable objective in 
this region?  What lessons that have worked in this region can be shared with the wider community? 
Contributions on Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and the following are encouraged:  
 » Mosul
It will take more than a decade to clear the unexploded ordnance contaminating the Iraqi city that 
was controlled by ISIS for three years. What have been the unique challenges and lessons learned 
from Mosul? In the future, how can these be applied to other areas of urban clearance, such as in 
Syria? Discussion of the challenges encountered as well as successes in clearing critical infrastruc-
ture (hospitals, schools, bridges), risk education for the local population, and training of local law 
enforcement and the military is encouraged. 
 » Yemen
Although the ongoing civil war between Houthi and Sunni tribes currently occurring in Yemen is 
producing new suspected hazardous areas, landmines have existed in the region for years. Insur-
gent activities and civil conﬂ icts between the north and south have resulted in widespread con-
tamination from landmines and cluster munitions. How are organizations mitigating the risks 
these explosives pose to civilians and what kind of clearance activities are being conducted? Are 
mine risk education programs eﬀ ective at limiting casualties? What types of explosive hazards are 
organizations encountering and what techniques are being used to defeat improvised landmines 
created in domestic workshops?
Afghanistan
As one of the most mined countries in the world, how are organizations working in Afghanistan 
countering legacy landmines and the removal of improvised explosive devices (IED), while incorpo-
rating community awareness and risk education into clearance operations? How are organizations 
adapting to clearance requirements in urban environments? What lessons can be learned from this 
region and applied to current conﬂ ict zones such as Syria? Discussion of current clearance programs 
is encouraged. 
Safe and Secure Management of Ammunition
Unplanned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS) worldwide, as well as the ongoing illicit proliferation of 
ammunition due to poor physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) practices at arms depots, 
highlight the need for increased international cooperation to combat these threats. Is more widespread 
application of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) the solution? What can be done 
to make the IATG more user-friendly and applicable for States with limited resources and training? And 
how can organizations that conduct safe and secure management of ammunition translate their expe-
riences into lessons learned that serve the broader community? What eﬀ orts are organizations making 
in places like Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world to prevent UEMS and monitor potential risks?
Distinguishing Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments
Ambiguously referred to as “the gray zone,” the existential diﬀ erences between conﬂ ict and 
post-conﬂ ict are becoming increasingly blurred. The situation in Mosul has demonstrated the need for 
international clearance teams to begin operations despite ongoing operations by international armed 
forces. In areas where humanitarian access is possible, how do organizations determine whether explo-
sive hazards are active or not? To what degree are humanitarian organizations responding to clearance 
requests normally reserved for military units?
Research and Development
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction seeks research and development (R&D) articles. All 
technical articles on current equipment, technology, trends, and developments in the ﬁ eld of mine 
action and CWD  will be considered. Commercial companies, NGO’s, and researchers are encouraged 
to submit. R&D articles are submitted to three experts for anonymous peer review. Two of the three 
reviewers must approve the article for publication. Reviewers approve articles for publication, suggest 
revisions or reject articles for publication.
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Explosives used in a planned demolition as part of the UN Mine Action Service’s 
demining operations.
Photo courtesy of UN Photo/Abel Kavanagh.
EDITORIAL
How Should We Assess New Technology?
In research and development, the challenge to secure new funding compounds the pressure of finding 
the next breakthrough technology in a manner that may inadvertently conflict with the development 
of technologies that field operators actually need. With limited funding and frequently delayed or am-
biguous communication between researchers at home and practitioners in the field, are incremental 
improvements in equipment more practical than the development of entirely new technologies? Is it 
possible to work more efficiently with current procedures without loss of quality or safety? How do 
we encourage greater honesty and transparency in order to objectively assess new technologies and 
methodologies? What test and use parameters should we use to assess counter-improvised explosive 
device (C-IED) equipment? What pitfalls have past assessment standards suffered from and how can 
we overcome these issues?
The Explosive Legacy in Southeast Asia: 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
Multiple civil wars as well as the Indochina Wars caused extensive landmine and cluster munition con-
tamination in Southeast Asia. With some of the densest minefields and highest concentrations of un-
exploded ordnance, what progress have organizations made in the region? How do operators approach 
the problems of remote access to many of the contaminated areas in these countries? With such ex-
tensive contamination, how do authorities prioritize which areas receive clearance efforts and how is 
the legacy problem hindering humanitarian relief and development across the region? Discussion of 
regional case studies is encouraged. 
Underwater Demining
The task of surveying and clearing territorial and inland waters presents new challenges and concerns 
for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators. Understanding the characteristics of explosives and 
chemical reactions in underwater environments involves extensive training. Which elements of so-
cio-economic impact are considered before determining clearance is necessary? What types of sensor 
technology exist for underwater survey, and how is this technology deployed? In what circumstances 
are various methods of disposal practiced, and how is the risk assessed? Where is underwater demin-
ing capacity needed most, and how can national mine action authorities become certified to conduct 
underwater operations?
Monitoring and Evaluation
How does your organization measure the impact of programs? What tools are used to assess progress, 
ensure best practice, lessons learned, sustainable benefits, and any remaining work to be done? How 
and through what means (survey, local meetings, field assessments, etc.) do you collect reliable data 
that provides a true reflection of the impact/success of programs? Submissions reflecting monitoring 
and evaluation of specific programs are encouraged.  
Demining Training Aids
The onset of virtual reality and 3D printing has created new and exciting opportunities in training solu-
tions for a variety of fields. What kind of applications does virtual reality have for EOD? In what ways 
has 3D printing benefited demining training purposes?
Research and Development
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction seeks research and development (R&D) articles. All 
technical articles on current equipment, technology, trends, and developments in the field of mine 
action and CWD  will be considered. Commercial companies, NGO’s, and researchers are encouraged 
to submit. R&D articles are submitted to three experts for anonymous peer review. Two of the three 
reviewers must approve the article for publication. Reviewers approve articles for publication, suggest 
revisions or reject articles for publication.
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Ammunition in Spartak, Eastern Ukraine.
Photo courtesy of UNICEF Ukraine.
EDITORIAL
Planning for the Future: Advancing Solutions for 
Unforeseen Threats
The prevalence of improvised explosive devices (IED) in conflicts throughout the world has shown the 
counter-IED and humanitarian mine action communities’ ability to improvise solutions, bridge infor-
mation gaps, and align goals in order to create a safe environment for civilians in a post-conflict world. 
However, technological progress and determined groups will ensure the vehicle for explosive hazards 
evolves. Despite this, how do we prepare for future threats? Can we devise solutions now for yet un-
anticipated explosive hazards? Share your thoughts and concerns on the field’s state of preparedness 
and current ability to contend with upcoming threats.
Ukraine
Since 2014, conflict has caused Ukraine to be contaminated with anti-personnel landmines and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO). With the most extensively contaminated regions being Luhansk and 
Donetsk, where are humanitarian demining organizations working? What kind of booby traps and 
anti-handling devices are humanitarian mine action operators encountering in Ukraine? What kind 
of improvements can be made to existing stockpiles to reduce the likelihood of unplanned explo-
sions of munitions sites? Due to the extensive contamination caused by the recent conflict, should 
Ukraine submit a request to extend the Article 5 clearance deadline?
Eastern Europe
The dissolution of the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s, the fall of the communist dictatorship in 
Yugoslavia, and the civil war all contributed to regional instabilities in Eastern Europe. Excess Cold-
War-era munitions stockpiles, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), and wide-
spread explosive contamination continue to affect the development of Eastern Europe. Targets for 
a mine-free Balkans in 2019 continue to be pushed back as large areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, and Serbia remain contaminated. With funding levels fluctuating over the years, 
what is being done to combat remaining landmines and UXO? How have initiatives reduced mine/
UXO contamination, munitions stockpiles, and risks of unplanned explosions of munitions sites? 
Which organizations are currently working in the area, and what programs are they conducting?
Anti-lift and Anti-handling Devices
Designed to prevent munitions from being disturbed, anti-lift or anti-handling devices increase 
the risk of unintentional detonation by deminers seeking to disarm them. Where are the devices 
frequently employed? How do they affect the clearance process? To what extent are anti-handling 
devices incorporated into improvised explosives? Which types of anti-handling devices are the most 
dangerous and how do explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and humanitarian mine action operators 
approach them when encountered? 
Small Arms and Light Weapon Destruction
The proliferation of (SA/LW) continues to be a growing issue in Africa and the Middle East. Fragile 
states in these regions have limited capacity to regulate aging government stockpiles, while armed 
violence, political instability, militias, and criminal networks hamper developing countries’ ability to 
manage and secure stockpiles. Focusing specifically on the destruction of SA/LW in Africa and the 
Middle East, what are the main issues faced by organizations working in this region? Organizations, 
policy-makers, and researchers are encouraged to submit articles discussing weapons destruction 
projects involving surplus or seized weapons, programs focusing on unsecured or abandoned weap-
ons due to regional instability, or case studies including best practices and lessons learned.
EOD Spot Tasks
In areas where clearance has already occurred or was considered unnecessary, EOD spot task teams 
rely on the local community and local authorities to indicate specific explosive hazards that need to 
be cleared. As these teams are typically smaller and operate more independently than larger groups 
of EOD specialist deminers, how do organizations ensure operational safety and effectiveness? In 
areas such as Syria and Iraq, where more complex tasks involve building searches or clearing rubble, 
how is output measured and how is efficiency achieved?
Research and Development
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction seeks research and development (R&D) articles. All 
technical articles on current equipment, technology, trends, and developments in the field of mine 
action and CWD  will be considered. Commercial companies, NGO’s, and researchers are encouraged 
to submit. R&D articles are submitted to three experts for anonymous peer review. Two of the three 
reviewers must approve the article for publication. Reviewers approve articles for publication, suggest 
revisions or reject articles for publication.
Subscribe to The Journal: 
http://jmu.edu/cisr/journal/subscribe.shtml
www.jmu.edu/cisr
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